

**POL585: International Political Economy**  
**Spring 2022**  
**Prof. Layna Mosley**

**Course meetings:** Tuesdays, 1:30-4:20pm, Robertson 008

**Contact Information:**

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**Course Overview:** This graduate seminar explores the domestic and international politics of the global economy. We consider the determinants and effects of various types of cross-border flows, including goods and services (trade), capital (finance, exchange rates), production (foreign direct investment and supply chains) and people (migration and remittances). The seminar aims to provide a theoretical grounding in the subfield: some of our readings each week are some “classics” in international political economy. Other readings represent the “cutting edge” for scholarship, providing a sense of the current state of knowledge and facilitating conversations about opportunities to contribute (theoretically as well as empirically) to our collective scholarly enterprise. Your final research project offers an opportunity to begin to develop such a contribution.

As a subfield, international political economy has a long history, making it impossible to cover all of the highly-cited older works during a single semester. This course also does not cover every topic that falls under the broad umbrella of international (and comparative) political economy. The required readings on articles, rather than on books, so that we can cover a broader set of scholarly works. There are, of course, many important books – old as well as new-- in the subfield. The syllabus also lists a few books that will offer important substantive background on trade and finance in the 20<sup>th</sup> and 21<sup>st</sup> centuries; and the recommended reading list includes books as well as articles.

Each week’s required reading list is accompanied by a (long) list of additional readings. Students who would like more background on a topic (in terms both of recent scholarship and of foundational works) are encouraged to consult those readings. I also am happy to provide further suggestions, both on topics covered in the syllabus as well as other areas related to international political economy. For the most recent research in international political economy, consult the [archive of papers](#) presented in the Global Research in International Political Economy webinar (May 2020-present), or the recent programs of the [International Political Economy Society](#) annual meetings.

**About the Instructor:** Layna Mosley is Professor in School of Public and International Affairs, as well as in the Department of Politics. Mosley’s research addresses international and comparative political economy. Her first book, *Global Capital and National Governments* (2003), examines the politics of sovereign debt; her second book, *Labor Rights and Multinational Production* (2011) explores the consequences of economic globalization for workers’ rights in developing countries. Mosley’s current research concerns the politics of sovereign debt and borrowing; the effects of multinational production and global supply chains on worker rights; and the governance of international financial markets. Mosley was a first-generation college student at

Rollins College; she earned her Ph.D. from Duke University. Prior to arriving at Princeton in 2020, Mosley spent 16 years on the faculty at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill and five years at the University of Notre Dame.

**Course Goals, Expectations and Requirements:** Like any graduate seminar, our class will be largely discussion-based. Therefore, students are expected to read thoroughly each of the assigned works and to arrive at seminar prepared to discuss the readings.

**Class Participation (20%).** Our weekly meetings will focus on the **required readings** listed on the syllabus. Please read all required items carefully, and come to seminar prepared to discuss them. Of course, there often is far more work on a given topic than what we can cover, especially if we aim to develop familiarity with canonical works, as well as a sense of cutting-edge research. The **further readings** section for each week lists additional work on each topic (or on closely-related topics). You might think of the required readings as starting points for your own research projects, but you'll certainly want to delve into the additional readings (and ask for further suggestions, as well) as you develop your own research questions and projects.

In preparing for our weekly meetings, you may find it helpful to have the following questions in mind as you read each article. (Occasionally, the syllabus includes review articles; these questions are less relevant for those):

- What is the article's research question? (What is this paper about...and not about?)
- What is the main theory/argument developed in the piece? What assumptions does the article make? Are those reasonable assumptions?
- How do the authors test their theory? Do their measures align well with the main components of the theoretical argument? Are there issues with the way the data (whether qualitative or quantitative) are constructed and analyzed?
- How might the theory or empirical analysis be improved, extended, or put into conversation with other research? Graduate students often become very adept at critiquing existing work; but success as an academic also requires creating solutions. What can we do better, individually or collectively, in this research area?

Our classroom meeting environment – whether that environment is in-person or virtual – should be one that is professional and inclusive. This means that, while we may disagree on questions of research design, or have different interpretations of theories and causal claims, we treat each other respectfully. To the extent that we take issue with someone's argument, we focus our criticism on specific claims and logic, rather than on an individual. We also are mindful that good discussion involves both listening and speaking; we are careful not to interrupt or talk over one another, as well as to be sure that all have an opportunity to participate. Should we transition to a virtual class, all participants are expected to (a) mute their audio on arrival to the call, and to keep audio off unless speaking; (b) keep video on throughout the call; (c) if using a virtual background, ensure that the background is professional in nature and not distracting to others (as most video backgrounds are, for instance).

**Short response papers (30%).** Each student will complete **four** response papers; each paper should be between four and five double-spaced pages. Each paper should be distributed to all seminar members, by posting it on the class Canvas site (see the Discussion Module labeled "response papers"). Other seminar

participants should try to read the response papers prior to class; papers should be posted no later than **8pm on Mondays**.

These are critical response papers, analyzing and discussing the required readings for a particular week. While papers may begin with a (very) short summary of the readings, the main task of the paper is critical analysis. In weeks where there is more than one person writing a response paper (as there usually will be), paper authors are welcome to coordinate among themselves, in terms of focusing their papers on some subset of the assigned readings. Please ensure among yourselves, though, that all required readings are covered by at least one of the papers.

Rather than summarize the readings, your paper should focus on what you see as the strengths and weaknesses of the readings; the possible intersections among the readings; and – perhaps most importantly – what theoretical issues and empirical questions for future research are raised by the readings. You may think of this as akin to writing a journal review: the best reviews quickly summarize the contribution; discuss what they like about the paper (indeed, the best reviewers are advocates for papers they love; not only critics of those they dislike); and discuss what could be changed or improved.

The response papers will serve as a starting point for our seminar discussion. You may write papers for any of the substantive weeks during the course; to evenly distribute papers across weeks, we will divide up papers and weeks during the first class session.

**Research Paper (50%).** The main written product for this course will be an article-length (25 to 40 double-spaced pages in total) paper, due on **May 3**. This paper should develop a specific research question related to some aspect of the politics of the global economy; generate testable hypotheses that address this research question; and provide an empirical (using qualitative, quantitative, or some combination of the two) assessment of the main hypotheses. Seminar papers should have both a theoretical and an empirical component; they might best be envisioned as the first draft of a 591 paper, conference paper, journal article, or dissertation chapter.

In many cases, the most difficult part of writing a strong seminar paper is generating, and refining, a research question. Please keep the seminar paper assignment in mind as you read for each week, and please ask if you would like further suggestions for reading on a given topic. Each student is required to submit a one to two page research proposal no later than **Friday, March 18**. This proposal should summarize your research question and give some information regarding how you plan to develop and test your main expectations/propositions/hypotheses. Please post this to Canvas (see “Research Proposal” module), so that others in the class can review your proposal prior to our class meeting on **March 23**.

### **Schedule of Topics and Reading Assignments**

*There are five books available for purchase; Frieden is listed as “required” while the others are “recommended.”* The Frieden book is intended to provide an empirical background for much of what we will discuss in this course. Eichengreen’s book provides a detailed history of the evolution of international monetary relations. Selections from Eichengreen and/or Frieden are listed as background reading for several of our class meetings. Cohen offers an intellectual history of the development of the international political economy subfield, both in the US and in the UK. Keohane’s book sets out the “neoliberal institutionalist” perspective on global cooperation and intergovernmental institutions, while Tomz uses the lens of reputation to analyze the political economy of sovereign debt.

Cohen, Benjamin. 2008. *International Political Economy: An Intellectual History*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Eichengreen, Barry. 2019. *Globalizing Capital: A History of the International Monetary System*. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Third Edition.

Frieden, Jeffrey. 2020. *Global Capital: Its Rise and Fall in the Twentieth Century*. New York: W.W. Norton, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition. [required]

Keohane, Robert. 1984. *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Tomz, Michael. 2007. *Reputation and International Cooperation: Sovereign Debt Across Three Centuries*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

***You are expected to read the assigned materials prior to that day's meeting. Please note that our January 25 meeting will be a full class meeting, with a substantive discussion.***

**Week 1:        January 25    Overview: the (US-based) Study of IPE**

**Required:**

Chaudoin, Stephen, Helen V. Milner, and Xun Pang. 2015. "International Systems and Domestic Politics: Linking Complex Interactions with Empirical Models in International Relations." *International Organization* 69 (3): 1-35.

Cohen, Benjamin J. (2008) *International Political Economy: An Intellectual History*. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Chapter 1. [You may find the entire book interesting as background regarding the development of the subfield in the US and the UK].

Farrell, Henry and Abraham L. Newman. 2019. ["Weaponized Interdependence: How Global Economic Networks Shape State Coercion."](#) *International Security* 44(1): 42-79.

Hafner-Burton, Emilie M., Stephan Haggard, David A. Lake, and David G. Victor. 2017. "The Behavioral Revolution and International Relations." *International Organization* 71(S1): S1–S31.

Lake, David A. 2009. "Open Economy Politics: A Critical Review," *The Review Of International Organizations* 4 (3): 219-244.

Stephanie J. Rickard. 2021. ["Open Economy Politics Revisited."](#) *Oxford Handbook of International Political Economy*.

Wincoff, William Kindred. 2020. "The Persistent Myth of Lost Hegemony,' [Revisited: Structural Power as a Complex Network Phenomenon.](#)" *European Journal of International Relations* 26(S1): 209–52.

**Further Reading:**

Blyth, Mark, and Matthias Matthijs. 2017. "Black Swans, Lame Ducks, and the Mystery of IPE's Missing Macroeconomy." *Review of International Political Economy* 24(2): 203–31.

- Cohen, Benjamin J. (2010) “Are IPE Journals Becoming Boring?” *International Studies Quarterly* 54: 887-891.
- Germain, Randall. 2021. “Modern IPE: Lessons from a Counter History.” *Oxford Handbook of International Political Economy*.
- Helleiner, Eric. 2011. “Understanding the 2007-2008 Global Financial Crisis: Lessons for Scholars of International Political Economy.” *Annual Review of Political Science* 14: 67–87.
- Keohane, Robert O. 2009. “The Old IPE and the New.” *Review of International Political Economy* 16(1): 34-46.
- Kertzer, Joshua D. 2017. “Microfoundations in International Relations.” *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 34(1): 81-97.
- Maliniak, Daniel and Michael J. Tierney. 2009. “The American school of IPE,” *Review of International Political Economy* 16 (1): 6-33.
- Mantz, Felix. 2019. “Decolonizing the IPE Syllabus: Eurocentrism and the Coloniality of Knowledge in International Political Economy.” *Review of International Political Economy* 26(6): 1361–78.
- Oatley, Thomas H. 2011. “The Reductionist Gamble: Open Economy Politics in the Global Economy.” *International Organization* 65(2): 311-41.
- Strange, Susan. 1988. *States and Markets*, New York: Bloomsbury, 2015 [1988].

**Week 2: February 1 The IPE Field, continued  
The Domestic Politics of Trade, Part I**

**Background:**

Frieden, Jeffrey. 2020. *Global Capital: Its Rise and Fall in the Twentieth Century*. New York: W.W. Norton, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition. Prologue and Chapters 1 through 5, pp. 1-126. (covers the first era of economic globalization).

**Required:**

Amodio, Francesco, Leonard Baccini, Giorgio Chiovelli and Michele Di Maio. 2022. “[Agricultural Comparative Advantage and Legislators’ Support for Trade Agreements](#).” *Journal of Politics*, FirstView.

Grossman, Gene, and Elhanan Helpman. 1994. “Protection for Sale.” *American Economic Review* 84(4): 833–50.

Kim, In Song. 2017. “Political Cleavages within Industry: Firm Level Lobbying for Trade Liberalization.” *American Political Science Review* 111(1): 1–20.

Kim, In Song and Iain Osgood. 2019. “Firms in Trade and Trade Politics.” *Annual Review of Political Science* 22: 399-417.

McNamara, Kathleen R., and Abraham L. Newman. 2020. “[The Big Reveal: COVID-19 and Globalization’s Great Transformations](#).” *International Organization*: 1–19.

Rogowski, Ronald. 1987. "Political Cleavages and Changing Exposure to Trade." *American Political Science Review* 81(4):1121-1137.

Tilley, Lisa, and Robbie Shilliam. 2018. "Raced Markets: An Introduction." *New Political Economy* 23(5): 534–43.

Zvobgo, Kelebogile and Meredith Loken. 2020. "Why Race Matters in International Relations." *Foreign Policy* June 19, 2020. (4 pp).

### **Further Reading:**

Alt, James E. and Michael Gilligan. 1994. "The Political Economy of Trading States: Factor Specificity, Collective Action Problems, and Domestic Political Institutions." *Journal of Political Philosophy* 2(2): 165–192.

Baccini, Leonardo. 2021. "Economics and Politics of Preferential Trade Institutions." *Oxford Handbook of International Political Economy*.

Baccini, Leonardo, Pablo M. Pinto, and Stephen Weymouth. 2017. "The Distributional Consequences of Preferential Trade Liberalization: Firm-Level Evidence." *International Organization* 71(2): 373–95.

Bailey, Michael A., Judith Goldstein and Barry R. Weingast. 1997. "The Institutional Roots of American Trade Policy: Politics, Coalitions, and International Trade." *World Politics* 49(3): 309–38.

Chaudoin, Stephen. 2014. "Audience Features and the Strategic Timing of Trade Disputes." *International Organization* 68(4): 877–911.

Davis, Christina L. 2004. "International Institutions and Issue Linkage: Building Support for Agricultural Trade liberalization." *American Political Science Review* 98(1): 153–169. (17 pp.)

Ehrlich, Sean. 2007. "Access to Protection: Domestic Institutions and Trade Policy in Democracies." *International Organization* 61 (3): 571-605.

Gawande, Kishore, and Bandyopadhyay Usree. 2000. "Is Protection for Sale? Evidence on the Grossman–Helpman Theory of Endogenous Protection." *Review of Economics and Statistic* 82(1): 139–152. (14 pp.)

Georgetown Program on Political Economy. 2020-2021 series on Race and International Political Economy. [Videos of eight presentations.](#)

Gourevitch, Peter A. 1978. "The Second Image Reversed: The International Sources of Domestic Politics." *International Organization* 32(4): 881–912.

Hiscox, Michael J. 1999. "The Magic Bullet? The RTAA, Institutional Reform and Trade Liberalization." *International Organization* 53 (4): 669-698.

Hiscox, Michael J. 2001. "Class Versus Industry Cleavages: Inter-Industry Factor Mobility and the Politics of Trade." *International Organization* 55(1): 1-46.

Hyde, Susan D., and Elizabeth N. Saunders. 2020. "Recapturing Regime Type in International Relations: Leaders, Institutions, and Agency Space." *International Organization* 74(2): 363–95.

Irwin, Douglas. 2017. *Clashing over Commerce: A History of U.S. Trade Policy*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Naoi, Megumi, and Ikuo Kume. 2011. "Explaining Mass Support for Agricultural Protectionism: Evidence from a Survey Experiment during the Global Recession." *International Organization* 65(4): 771–795.

Putnam, Robert. 1988. "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games," *International Organization* 42: 427-460.

["Special Collection: Race and Identity in the Study of International Political Economy."](#) 2021. *Global Perspectives*. Includes commentaries by Atal, Mosley, Wellhausen, Yanitell-Reinhardt, and link to GRIPE session on race (September 30, 2020).

### **Week 3: February 8 The Domestic Politics of Trade, Part II**

#### **Background:**

Frieden, Jeffrey. 2020. *Global Capital: Its Rise and Fall in the Twentieth Century*. New York: W.W. Norton, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition. Chapters 6 through 10, pp. 127-251. (covers the interwar era, 1920s and 1930s).

#### **Required:**

Ahlquist, John S., Amanda B. Clayton, and Margaret Levi. 2014. "Provoking Preferences: Unionization, Workers' Attitudes toward International Trade, and the ILWU Puzzle." *International Organization* 68(1): 33-75.

Guisinger, Alexandra. 2009. "Determining Trade Policy: Do Voters Hold Politicians Accountable?" *International Organization* 63 (3): 533-557.

Kono, Daniel Y. 2006. "Optimal Obfuscation: Democracy and Trade Policy Transparency," *American Political Science Review* 100(3): 369-284.

Mansfield, Edward and Diana Mutz. 2009. "Support for Free Trade: Self-Interest, Sociotropic Politics, and Out-group Anxiety." *International Organization* 63(2): 425-57.

Milner, Helen V. and Keiko Kubota. 2005. "Why the Move to Free Trade? Democracy and Trade Policy in the Developing Countries." *International Organization* 59(1): 107–43.

Owen, Erica and Noel P. Johnston. 2017. "Occupation and the Political Economy of Trade: Job Routineness, Offshorability, and Protectionist Sentiment." *International Organization* 71(4): 665–99.

Rickard, Stephanie. 2015. ["Electoral Systems and Trade."](#) *Oxford Handbook of the Political Economy of International Trade*.

Zucker, Noah. 2021. ["Free Trade and Forms of Democratization."](#) *Journal of Politics* 83(4): 1867-1871.

#### **Further Reading:**

Baker, Andy. 2005. "Who Wants to Globalize? Consumer Tastes and Labor Markets in a Theory of Trade Policy Beliefs." *American Journal of Political Science* 49(4): 924–38.

- Ballard-Rosa, Cameron, Allison Carnegie and Nikhar Gaikwad. 2018. "Economic Crises and Trade Policy Competition." *British Journal of Political Science* 48(3): 713-748.
- Fordham, Benjamin O., and Katja B. Kleinberg. 2012. "How Can Economic Interests Influence Support for Free Trade?" *International Organization* 66(2): 311–28.
- Guisinger, Alexandra. 2017. *American Opinion on Trade: Preferences without Politics*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Jensen, J. Bradford, Dennis P. Quinn, and Stephen Weymouth. 2017. "Winners and Losers in International Trade: The Effects on US Presidential Voting." *International Organization* 71(3): 423-57.
- Mansfield, Edward D., Helen V. Milner, and B. Peter Rosendorff. 2000. "Free to Trade: Democracies, Autocracies, and International Trade." *American Political Science Review* 94(2): 305–321
- Mansfield, Edward D., Helen V. Milner, and B. Peter Rosendorff. 2002. "Why Democracies Cooperate More: Electoral Control and International Trade Agreements." *International Organization* 56 (3):477–513.
- Mayda, Anna Maria, and Dani Rodrik. 2005. "Why Are Some People (and Countries) More Protectionist than Others?" *European Economic Review* 49(6): 1393–1430.
- McGillivray, Fiona. 1997. "Party Discipline as a Determinant of the Endogenous Formation of Tariffs." *American Journal of Political Science* 41(2): 584-607.
- Menendez, Irene, Erica Owen, and Stefanie Walter. 2018. "[Low-Skilled Products by High-Skilled Workers: The Distributive Effects of Trade in Developing Countries.](#)" APSA/UZH working paper:
- Rho, S. and Tomz, Michael. 2017. "Why Don't Trade Preferences Reflect Economic Self-Interest?" *International Organization* 71(1): 85-108.
- Rickard, Stephanie J. 2012. A Non-Tariff Protectionist Bias in Majoritarian Politics: Government Subsidies and Electoral Institutions. *International Studies Quarterly* 56 (4): 777– 785.
- Rickard, Stephanie J. 2018. [\*Spending to Win: Political Institutions, Economic Geography, and Government Subsidies\*](#). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Scheve, Kenneth F. and Matthew J. Slaughter. 2001. "What Determines Individual Trade-Policy Preferences?" *Journal of International Economics* 54 (3):267-92.

**Week 4: February 15 Governing Trade Internationally**

**Background:**

Frieden, Jeffrey. 2020. *Global Capital: Its Rise and Fall in the Twentieth Century*. New York: W.W. Norton, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition. Chapters 11-13 (pp. 253-320). *Covers the post-World War II period.*

*For deeper historical background on the GATT (the WTO's predecessor), listen to Episode 9 of the [Trade Talks podcast](#). (Link to [entire series](#), now with 159+ episodes).*



**Required:**

Goldstein, Judith L., Douglas Rivers, and Michael Tomz. 2007. "Institutions in International Relations: Understanding the Effects of the GATT and the WTO on World Trade." *International Organization* 61(1): 37–67.

Gowa, Joanne, and Edward D. Mansfield. 2004. "Alliances, Imperfect Markets, and Major-Power Trade." *International Organization* 58(4): 775–805.

Keohane, Robert O. 1984. [\*After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy\*](#) (Princeton: Princeton University Press), Chapters 2 through 4 (pp. 18–64).

Krasner, Stephen D. 1976. "State Power and the Structure of International Trade." *World Politics* 28(3): 317–47.

Kim, In Song, John Londregan and Marc Ratkovic. 2020. "The Effects of Political Institutions on the Extensive and Intensive Margins of Trade." *International Organization* 73 (4): 755–792.

Manger, Mark S. 2012. "Vertical Trade Specialization and the Formation of North-South PTAs." *World Politics* 64 (4): 622–58.

Milgrom, Douglass North, and Barry Weingast. 1990. "The Role of Institutions in the Revival of Trade." *Economics & Politics* 2(1): 1–23.

Pelc, Krzysztof J. 2011. "Why do Some Countries Get Better WTO Accession Terms than Others?" *International Organization* 65(4): 639–72.

Peritz, Lauren. 2020. ["When are International Institutions Effective? The Impact of Domestic Veto Players on Compliance with WTO Rulings."](#) *International Studies Quarterly* 64(1): 220–234.

Rosendorff, B. Peter and Helen V. Milner. 2001. "The Optimal Design of International Trade Institutions: Uncertainty and Escape." *International Organization* 55(4): 829–57.

**Further Reading:**

Baccini, Leonardo, Andreas Duer, and Manfred Elsig, 2015. "The Politics of Trade Agreement Design: Revisiting the Depth-Flexibility Nexus." *International Studies Quarterly* 59(4): 765–775.

Bagwell, Kyle and Robert W. Staiger (2010) "The World Trade Organization: Theory and Practice." *Annual Review of Economics* 2:223–56.

Busch, Marc L. 2007. "Overlapping Institutions, Forum Shopping, and Dispute Settlement in International Trade." *International Organization* 61(4): 735–61.

Carnegie, Allison. 2014. ["States Held Hostage: Political Hold-Up Problems and the Effects of International Institutions."](#) *American Political Science Review*, 108(1): 54–70.

Davis, Christina and Sarah Blodgett Bermeo. 2009. "Who Files? Developing Country Participation in GATT/WTO Adjudication." *The Journal of Politics* 71(3): 1033–1049.

Davis, Christina and Tyler Pratt. 2020. "[The Forces of Attraction: How security interests shape membership in economic institutions.](#)" *Review of International Organizations*.

Davis, Christina L and Meredith Wilf, 2017. "Joining the Club: Accession to the GATT/WTO." *Journal of Politics* 79(3).

Gilpin, Robert. 2001. *Global Political Economy: Understanding the International Economic Order*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Gowa, Joanne and Edward Mansfield. 1993. "Power Politics and International Trade." *American Political Science Review* 87(2): 408–420.

Hirschman, Albert O. 1945. *National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Johns, Leslie and Krzysztof J. Pelc. 2018. "Free Riding on Enforcement in the WTO." *Journal of Politics* 80(3): 873-89.

Kindleberger, Charles. 1973. *The World In Depression*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Krasner, Stephen D. 1991. "Global Communications and National Power: Life on the Pareto Frontier," *World Politics* 43.

Kucik, Jeffrey. 2019. "How Do Prior Rulings Affect Future Disputes?" *International Studies Quarterly* 63(4): 1122-32.

Mansfield, Edward D. and Mark Busch. 1995. "The Political Economy of Non-Tariff Barriers: A Cross-National Analysis," *International Organization* 49(4): 723-749.

Mansfield, Edward D., Helen V. Milner, and B. Peter Rosendorff. 2002. "Why Democracies Cooperate More: Electoral Control and International Trade Agreements." *International Organization* 56(3): 477–513.

Mansfield, Edward D., and Eric Reinhardt. 2008. "International Institutions and the Volatility of International Trade." *International Organization* 62(4): 621-652.

Morrison, James Ashley. 2012. "Before Hegemony: Adam Smith, American Independence, and the Origins of the First Era of Globalization." *International Organization* 66(3): 395–428.

Rose, Andrew K. 2004. "Do We Really Know That the WTO Increases Trade?" *American Economic Review* 94(1): 98–114.

Also see response from Tomz, Goldstein and Rivers, 2007. "Do We Really Know That the WTO Increases Trade? Comment." *American Economic Review* 97(5): 2005–18; and Rose, 2007. "Do We Really Know That the WTO Increases Trade? Reply." *American Economic Review* 97(5): 2019–2025.

Singh, J. P. 2017. *Sweet Talk: Paternalism and Collective Action in North-South Trade Negotiations*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

Staiger, Robert W. and Guido Tabellini, 1999. "Do GATT Rules Help Governments Make Domestic Commitments?" *Economics and Politics* 11(2): 109-144.

Steinberg, Richard H. 2002. "In the Shadow of Law or Power? Consensus-Based Bargaining and Outcomes in the GATT/WTO." *International Organization* 56(2): 339-374.

**Week 5: February 22 Compensation, Backlash and Embedded Liberalism**

**Background:**

Frieden, Jeffrey. 2020. *Global Capital: Its Rise and Fall in the Twentieth Century*. New York: W.W. Norton, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition. Chapters 15, 20 and 21(pp. 4339-361; 57-506).

Walter, Stefanie. 2021. "The Backlash Against Globalization." *Annual Review of Political Science*, 24: 421-42.

**Required:**

Anelli, Massimo, Italo Colatone and Piero Stanig. 2019. "[We Were the Robots: Automation and Voting Behavior in Western Europe.](#)". Manuscript.

Ansell, Benjamin W., J. Lawrence Broz and Thomas Flaherty. 2018. "Global Capital Markets, Housing Prices, and Partisan Fiscal Policies." *Economics and Politics* 30(3): 307-339.

Baccini, Leonardo and Stephen Weymouth. 2021. "[Gone for Good: Deindustrialization, White Voter Backlash and US Presidential Voting.](#)" *American Political Science Review* 115(2): 550-567.

Broz, J. Lawrence, Jeffrey Frieden and Stephen Weymouth. 2021. "Populism in Place: The Economic Geography of the Globalization Backlash." *International Organization* 75(2): 464-494.

Dean, Adam. 2018. "[NAFTA's Army: Free Trade and US Military Enlistment.](#)" *International Studies Quarterly* 62(4): 845-856.

Mansfield, Edward and Nita Rudra. 2021. "[Embedded Liberalism in the Digital Era.](#)" *International Organization* 75(2): 558-585.

Pelc, Sung-Eun and Krzysztof Pelc. 2021. "[Trade Competition and Worker Compensation: Why Do Some Receive More than Others?](#)" *International Studies Quarterly* 65(1): 109-121.

Wibbels, Erik. 2006. "Dependency Revisited: International Markets, Business Cycles, and Social Spending in the Developing World." *International Organization* 60: 433-468.

**Further Reading**

Ansell, Ben. 2014. "The Political Economy of Ownership: Housing Markets and the Welfare State." *American Political Science Review* 108(2): 383-402.

Autor, David H., David Dorn and Gordon H. Hanson. "[The China Shock: Learning from Labor-Market Adjustment to Large Changes in Trade.](#)" *Annual Review of Economics* 8(1): 205-240.

- Autor, David H., David Dorn, Gordon H. Hanson, and Kaveh Majlesi. 2020. "Importing Political Polarization? The Electoral Consequences of Rising Trade Exposure." *American Economic Review* 110(10): 3139-83.
- Baldwin, Richard. 2019. *The Globotics Upheaval: Globalisation, Robotics and the Future of Work*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Burgoon, Brian. 2009. "Globalization and Backlash: Polanyi's Revenge?" *Review of International Political Economy* 16(2): 145-77.
- Colatone, Italo and Piero Stanig. 2018. ["The Trade Origins of Economic Nationalism: Import Competition and Voting Behavior in Western Europe."](#) *American Journal of Political Science* 62: 936-953.
- Dean, Adam. 2015. "The Gilded Wage: Profit-Sharing Institutions and the Political Economy of Trade." *International Studies Quarterly* 59 (2): 316-329.
- Garrett, Geoffrey. 1998. *Partisan Politics in the Global Economy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Goldstein, Judith and Robert Gulotty. ["America and the Trade Regime: What Went Wrong?"](#) *International Organization* 75(2): 524-557.
- Hays, Jude. 2009. *Globalization and the New Politics of Embedded Liberalism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Iversen, Torben, and Thomas R. Cusack. 2000. "The Causes of Welfare State Expansion: Deindustrialization or Globalization?" *World Politics* 52(3): 313-349.
- Klein, Matthew C., and Michael Pettis. 2020. *Trade Wars are Class Wars*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Keohane, Robert O. and Helen V. Milner. eds. 1996. *Internationalization and Domestic Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- LeBaron, Genevieve, Daniel Mügge, Jacqueline Best, and Colin Hay. 2020. "Blind Spots in IPE: Marginalized Perspectives and Neglected Trends in Contemporary Capitalism." *Review of International Political Economy*: 1-12.
- Milner, Helen V. 2021. ["Voting for Populism in Europe: Globalization, Technological Change, and the Extreme Right"](#) *Comparative Political Studies* 54(13).
- Nooruddin, Irfan, and Nita Rudra. 2014. "Are Developing Countries Really Defying the Embedded Liberalism Compact?" *World Politics* 66(4): 603-640.
- Margalit, Yotam. 2011. "Costly Jobs: Trade-Related Layoffs, Government Compensation, and Voting in U.S. Elections." *American Political Science Review* 105(1): 166-88.
- Piketty, Thomas. 2014. *Capital in the Twenty-First Century*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Rodrik, Dani. 1997. *Has Globalization Gone Too Far?* Washington: Institute for International Economics.

Rodrik, Dani. 2021. [“Why Does Globalization Fuel Populism? Economics, Culture and the Rise of Right-Wing Populism.”](#) *Annual Review of Economics* 13 :133-70.

Rodrik, Dani. 1998. “Why Do More Open Economies Have Bigger Governments?” *Journal of Political Economy* 106(5): 997–1032.

Rudra, Nita. 2002. “Globalization and the Decline of the Welfare State in Less Developed Countries.” *International Organization* 56(2): 411-445.

Ruggie, John Gerard. 1982. [“International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order.”](#) *International Organization* 36(2): 379–415.

Scheve, Kenneth F. and Matthew J. Slaughter. 2004. “Economic Insecurity and the Globalization of Production.” *American Journal of Political Science* 48(4): 662–674.

Walter, Stefanie. 2010. “Globalization and the Welfare State: Testing the Microfoundations of the Compensation Hypothesis.” *International Studies Quarterly* 54: 403–426.

Zucman, Gabriel. 2013. *The Hidden Wealth of Nations : The Scourge of Tax Havens*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

**Week 6:            March 1                            Multinational Production, Foreign Direct Investment and Global Supply Chains**

**Background:**

Frieden, Jeffrey. 2020. *Global Capital: Its Rise and Fall in the Twentieth Century*. New York: W.W. Norton, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition. Chapters 14, 18 and 19 (pp. 321-338; 413-455). *Covers the rise and fall of socialism, as well as export-led growth and the expansion of global production networks.*

**Required:**

Gereffi, Gary, John Humphrey, and Timothy Sturgeon. 2005. “The Governance of Global Value Chains.” *Review of International Political Economy* 12(1): 78–104.

Hassan, Tarek A., Stephan Hollander, Laurence van Lent, and Ahmed Tahoun. 2019. [“Firm-Level Political Risk: Measurement and Effects.”](#) *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 134(4): 2135-2202. *This [website](#) provides additional data and analysis.*

Johns, Leslie, and Rachel L. Wellhausen. 2016. “Under One Roof: Supply Chains and the Protection of Foreign Investment.” *American Political Science Review* 110(1): 31–51. (21 pp.)

Jung, Yoo Sun, Erica Owen and Gyu Sang Shim. 2021. [Heterogeneity in How Investors Respond to Disputes: Greenfield Foreign Direct Investment and Co-industrial Disputes.](#) *The Journal of Politics* 83(4).

Li, Quan, Erica Owen, and Austin Mitchell. 2018. “Why Do Democracies Attract More or Less Foreign Direct Investment? A Metaregression Analysis.” *International Studies Quarterly* 62(3): 494–504.

Malesky, Edmund and Layna Mosley. 2018. [“Chains of Love? Global Production and the Firm-Level Diffusion of Labor Standards.”](#) *American Journal of Political Science* 62: 712-728.

Osgood, Iain. 2018. [“Globalizing the Supply Chain: Firm and Industrial Support for US Trade Agreements.”](#) *International Organization* 72(2): 455-484.

Pandya, Sonal S. 2010. “Labor Markets and the Demand for Foreign Direct Investment.” *International Organization* 64(3): 389–409.

**Further Reading:**

Ahlquist, John S. 2006. “Economic Policy, Institutions, and Capital Flows: Portfolio and Direct Investment Flows in Developing Countries.” *International Studies Quarterly* 50: 681-704.

Beazer, Quentin and Daniel Blake. 2018. “The Conditional Nature of Political Risk: How Home Institutions Influence the Location of Foreign Direct Investment.” *American Journal of Political Science* 62(2): 470-485.

Betz, Timm and Amy Pond. 2019. “Foreign Financing and the International Sources of Property Rights.” *World Politics* 71(3): 503-541.

Büthe, Tim and Helen V. Milner. 2008. “The Politics of Foreign Direct Investment into Developing Countries: Increasing FDI through International Trade Agreements?” *American Journal of Political Science* 52(4): 741-762.

Danzman, Sarah Bauerle. 2019. *Merging Interests: When Domestic Firms Shape FDI Policy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Danzman, Sarah Bauerle and Sophie Meunier. 2021. “The Big Screen: Mapping the Diffusion of Foreign Investment Screening Mechanisms.” Manuscript, August 2021.

Distelhorst, Greg and Richard M. Locke. 2018. [“Does Compliance Pay?”](#) *American Journal of Political Science* 62(3): 695-711.

Elkins, Zachary, Andrew T. Guzman, and Beth A. Simmons. 2006. “Competing for Capital: The Diffusion of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 1960-2000.” *International Organization* 60(4): 811–46.

Helpman, Elhanan. 2006. “Trade, FDI and the Organization of Firms.” *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 44: 589-630.

Henisz, Witold J. 2000. “The Institutional Environment for Multinational Investment.” *Journal of Law, Economics and Organization* 16(2): 334–64.

Jensen, Nathan M. 2003. “Democratic Governance and Multinational Corporations: Political Regimes and Inflows of Foreign Direct Investment.” *International Organization* 57(3): 587–616.

Kerner, Andrew and Jane Lawrence. 2014. “What’s the Risk? Bilateral Investment Treaties, Political Risk and Fixed Capital Accumulation.” *British Journal of Political Science* 44(1): 107-121.

Kerner, Andrew and Krzysztof Pelc. 2021. [“Do Investor-State Disputes \(Still\) Harm FDI?”](#) *British Journal of Political Science* 1-24.

Kobrin, Stephen J. 1987. “Testing the Bargaining Hypothesis in the Manufacturing Sector in Developing Countries.” *International Organization* 41(4): 609–38.

Jensen, Nathan M., Glen Biglaiser, Quan Li, Edmund Malesky, Pablo M. Pinto, Santiago M. Pinto, and Joseph L. Staats. 2012. *Politics and Foreign Direct Investment*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Li, Quan, and Adam Resnick. 2003. "Reversal of Fortunes: Democratic Institutions and Foreign Direct Investment to Developing Countries." *International Organization* 57(1): 175–211.

Malesky, Edmund J. 2008. "Straight Ahead on Red: How Foreign Direct Investment Empowers Subnational Leaders." *Journal of Politics* 70(1): 97-119.

Markusen, James R. 1995. "The Boundaries of Multinational Enterprises and the Theory of International Trade." *The Journal of Economic Perspectives* 9: 169-189.

Moehlecke, Carolina. 2020. "[The Chilling Effect of International Investment Disputes: Limited Challenges to State Sovereignty.](#)" *International Studies Quarterly* 64(1): 1-12.

Mosley, Layna. 2011. *Labor Rights and Multinational Production*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Pandya, Sonal S. 2014. *Trading Spaces: Foreign Direct Investment Regulation, 1970-2000*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Pelc, Krzysztof J. 2017. "What Explains the Low Success Rate of Investor-State Disputes?" *International Organization* 71(3): 559–83.

Pinto, Pablo. 2013. *Partisan Investment in the Global Economy: Why the Left Loves Foreign Direct Investment and FDI Loves the Left*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Wellhausen, Rachel L. 2015. *The Shield of Nationality: When Governments Break Contracts with Foreign Firms*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

## Spring Recess March 8

### Week 7:            March 15                            Monetary Institutions, Exchange Rates and Capital Mobility

#### Background:

Frieden, Jeffrey. 2020. *Global Capital: Its Rise and Fall in the Twentieth Century*. New York: W.W. Norton, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition. Chapter 15 (pp. 339-361). *Addresses the end of the Bretton Woods system (early 1970s)*.

Eichengreen, Barry. *Globalizing Capital: A History of the International Monetary System*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 3<sup>rd</sup> edition. Chapters 3 and 4 (pp. 41-124). *Covers monetary relations during the interwar and Bretton Woods years. For background on the pre-World War I gold standard, see Chapter 2 (pp. 5-40)*.

#### Required:

Bernhard, William, J. Lawrence Broz, and William Roberts Clark. 2002. "The Political Economy of Monetary Institutions." *International Organization* 56(4): 693–723.

Frieden, Jeffrey A. 1991. "Invested Interests: The Politics of National Economic Policies in a World of Global Finance." *International Organization* 45(4): 425–51.

Haggard, Stephan and Sylvia Maxfield. 1996. "The Political Economy of Financial Internationalization in the Developing World." *International Organization* 50(1): 35-68.

Morrison, James Ashley. 2016. "Shocking Intellectual Austerity: The Role of Ideas in the Demise of the Gold Standard in Britain." *International Organization* 70(1): 171-207.

Pepinsky, Thomas B. 2013. "The Domestic Politics of Financial Internationalization in the Developing World." *Review of International Political Economy* 20(4): 848-880.

Pond, Amy. 2017. "Financial Liberalization: Stable Autocracies and Constrained Democracies." *Comparative Political Studies* 51(1): 105-135.

Simmons, Beth A., and Zachary Elkins. 2004. "The Globalization of Liberalization: Policy Diffusion in the International Political Economy." *American Political Science Review* 98(1): 171-189.

Walter, Stefanie. 2008. "A New Approach for Determining Exchange-Rate Level Preferences." *International Organization* 62(3): 405-438.

#### **Further Reading:**

Bates, Robert H., and Da-Hsiang Donald Lien. 1985. "A Note on Taxation, Development, and Representative Government." *Politics and Society* 14(1): 53-70.

Bearce, David. 2014. "A Political Explanation for Exchange-Rate Regime Gaps." *Journal of Politics* 76(1): 58-72.

Bernhard, William and David Leblang, 1999. "Democratic Institutions and Exchange Rate Commitments," *International Organization* 53 (1): 71-97.

Bodea, Cristina and Raymond Hicks. 2015. "Price Stability and Central Bank Independence: Discipline, Credibility, and Democratic Institutions." *International Organization* 69: 35-61.

Brooks, Sarah M. and Marcus J. Kurtz. 2012. "Paths to Financial Policy Diffusion: Statist Legacies in Latin America's Globalization." *International Organization* 66(1): 95-128.

Broz, J. Lawrence. 1999. "Origins of the Federal Reserve System: International Incentives and the Domestic Free-Rider Problem." *International Organization* 53(1): 39-70.

Broz, J. Lawrence, and Seth H. Werfel. 2014. "Exchange Rates and Industry Demands for Trade Protection." *International Organization* 68(2): 393-416.

Chaudoin, Stephen, and Helen V. Milner. 2017. "Science and the System: IPE and International Monetary Politics." *Review of International Political Economy* 24(4): 681-98.

Chwieroth, Jeffrey. 2007. "Neoliberal Economists and Capital Account Liberalization in Emerging Markets." *International Organization* 61(2): 443-463.



- Chwieroth, Jeffrey. 2011. *Capital Ideas: The IMF and the Rise of Financial Liberalization*. Princeton University Press.
- Clark, William R. and Mark Hallerberg. 2000. "Mobile Capital, Domestic Institutions, and Electorally Induced Monetary and Fiscal Policy." *American Political Science Review* 94(2): 323–46.
- Cohen, Benjamin J. 2004. *The Future of Money* (Princeton: Princeton University Press).
- Copelovitch, Mark S., and Jon C.W. Pevehouse. 2013. "Ties that Bind? Preferential Trade Agreements and Exchange Rate Policy Choice." *International Studies Quarterly* 57(2): 385–399.
- Eichengreen, Barry. 2011. *Exorbitant Privilege: The Rise and Fall of the Dollar and the Future of the International Monetary System*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Frantz, Erica. 2018. "[Elections and Capital Flight: Evidence from Africa.](#)" *International Studies Quarterly* 62(1): 160–170. Also see the [response](#) and [rejoinder](#).
- Frieden, Jeffrey. 2015. *Currency Politics*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Guisinger, Alexandra, and David Andrew Singer. 2010. "Exchange Rate Proclamations and Inflation-Fighting Credibility." *International Organization* 64 (1): 313-37.
- Helleiner, Eric. 2003. *The Making of National Money: Territorial Currencies in Historical Perspective*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Kirshner, Jonathan. 2007. *Appeasing Bankers: Financial Caution on the Road to War*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Kose, M. Ayhan , Eswar Prasad, Kenneth Rogoff, and Shang-Jin Wei. 2006. "[Financial Globalization: A Reappraisal.](#)" *IMF Staff Papers* 56(1).
- Leblang, David. 1999. "Domestic Political Institutions and Exchange Rate Commitments in the Developing World," *International Studies Quarterly* 43 (4): 599-620. .
- McNamara, Kathleen. 1998. *The Currency of Ideas: Monetary Politics in the European Union*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Mundell, Robert A. 1961. "A Theory of Optimum Currency Areas." *The American Economic Review* 51(4): 657-665.
- Obstfeld, Maurice, Jay C. Shambaugh and Alan M. Taylor. 2005. "The Trilemma in History: Tradeoffs Among Exchange Rates, Monetary Policies, and Capital Mobility." *Review of Economics and Statistics* 87(3): 423–438.
- Pepinsky, Thomas B. 2008. "Capital Mobility and Coalitional Politics: Authoritarian Regimes and Economic Adjustment in Southeast Asia." *World Politics* 60: 438-74.
- Quinn, Dennis P., and A. Maria Toyoda. 2007. "Ideology and Voter Preferences as Determinants of Financial Globalization." *American Journal of Political Science* 51 (2): 344–63.

Simmons, Beth A. 1994. *Who Adjusts? Domestic Sources of Foreign Economic Policy during the Interwar Years*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

**Week 8:            March 22                            Finance and Debt**

**Background:**

Eichengreen, Barry. *Globalizing Capital: A History of the International Monetary System*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 3<sup>rd</sup> edition, Chapter 5 (pp. 127-174). *Details monetary and financial relations after Bretton Woods*.

**Required:**

Ballard-Rosa, Cameron, Layna Mosley and Rachel Wellhausen. 2021. "[Contingent Advantage? Sovereign Borrowing, Democratic Institutions and Global Capital Cycles.](#)" *British Journal of Political Science* 51(1): 353-373

Brooks, Sarah M., Raphael Cunha, and Layna Mosley. 2015. "Categories, Creditworthiness, and Contagion: How Investors' Shortcuts Affect Sovereign Debt Markets." *International Studies Quarterly* 59(3): 587–601.

Gray, Julia. 2009. "International Organization as a Seal of Approval: European Union Accession and Investor Risk." *American Journal of Political Science* 53 (4): 931-949.

Panizza, Ugo, Federico Sturzenegger, and Jeromin Zettelmeyer. 2009. "The Economics and Law of Sovereign Debt and Default." *Journal of Economic Literature* 47(3): 651–698.

Schultz, Kenneth A. and Barry R. Weingast. 2003. "The Democratic Advantage: Institutional Foundations of Financial Power in International Competition." *International Organization* 57(1): 3–42.

Tomz, Michael. 2007. *Reputation and International Cooperation: Sovereign Debt across Three Centuries*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Chapters 1 and 2 (pp. 1-36). *The remainder of the book presents an empirical test, in the realm of sovereign debt, of the theoretical claims.*

Tomz, Michael and Mark L. G. Wright. 2013. "[Empirical Research on Sovereign Debt and Default.](#)" *Annual Review of Economics* 5: 247-272.

Zeitz, Alexandra. 2021. "[Global Capital Cycles and Market Discipline: Perceptions of Developing Country Borrowers.](#)" *British Journal of Political Science*, 1-10.

**Further Reading:**

Beaulieu, Emily, Gary W. Cox and Sebastian Saiegh. 2012. "Sovereign Debt and Regime Type: Reconsidering the Democratic Advantage." *International Organization* 6 (4): 709-738.

Bernhard, William T. and David Leblang, 2006. *Democratic Processes and Financial Markets: Pricing Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Eaton, Jonathan, and Mark Gersovitz. 1981. "Debt with Potential Repudiation: Theoretical and Empirical Analysis." *Review of Economic Studies* 48(2): 289–309.

Gray, Julia. 2013. *The Company States Keep: International Economic Organizations and Sovereign Risk in Emerging Markets*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Kaplan, Stephen & Kaj Thomsson. 2017. "The Political Economy of Sovereign Debt: Global Finance and Electoral Cycles." *Journal of Politics* 79(2).

Krippner, Greta R. 2017. "Democracy of Credit: Ownership and the Politics of Credit Access in Late-Twentieth Century America." *American Journal of Sociology* 123 (1): 1-47.

Mosley, Layna. 2003. *Global Capital and National Governments*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Queralt, Didac. 2019. "War, International Finance, and Fiscal Capacity in the Long Run." *International Organization* 73(4): 713-53.

Saiegh, Sebastian M. 2005. "Do Countries Have a 'Democratic Advantage?' Political Institutions, Multilateral Agencies and Sovereign Borrowing." *Comparative Political Studies* 38: 366-387.

Slantchev, Branislav L. 2012. "Borrowed Power: Debt Finance and the Resort to Arms." *American Political Science Review* 106(4): 787-809.

Stasavage, David. 2011. *States of Credit: Size, Power and the Development of European Polities*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

## **Week 9:            March 29                            Financial Crises and Adjustment**

### **Background:**

Eichengreen, Barry. *Globalizing Capital: A History of the International Monetary System*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 3<sup>rd</sup> edition, Chapters 6 and 7 (pp. 175-249). *Discusses financial crises in the late 1990s and early 2000s.*

Frieden, Jeffrey. 2020. *Global Capital: Its Rise and Fall in the Twentieth Century*. New York: W.W. Norton, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition. Chapters 16, 17 and 19 (pp. 363-411; 435-455). *Addresses the growth of global finance, as well as more recent imbalances and crises.*

### **Required:**

Ahlquist, John S., Mark Copelovitch, and Stefanie Walter. 2020. "The Political Economy of External Shocks: Evidence from Poland." *American Journal of Political Science* 64(4): 904-920.

Ballard-Rosa, Cameron. 2016. ["Hungry for Change: Urban Bias and Autocratic Sovereign Default."](#) *International Organization* 70(2): 313-346.

Curtis, K. Amber, Joseph Jupille and David Leblang. 2014. "Iceland on the Rocks: The Mass Political Economy of Sovereign Debt Resettlement." *International Organization* 68: 721-740.

Danzman, Sarah Bauerle, W. Kindred Wincoff, and Thomas Oatley. 2017. "All Crises Are Global: Capital Cycles in an Imbalanced International Political Economy." *International Studies Quarterly* 61(4): 907-23.

Kalyanpur, Nikhil and Abraham Newman. 2019. "Mobilizing Market Power: Jurisdictional Expansion as Economic Statecraft." *International Organization* 73(1): 1-34.

Leblang, David, and Shanker Satyanath. 2006. "Institutions, Expectations, and Currency Crises." *International Organization* 60(1): 245–262.

Lipsky, Phillip Y. 2018. "Democracy and Financial Crisis." *International Organization* 72(4): 937–68.

**Further Reading:**

Ballard-Rosa, Cameron. 2020. *Democracy, Dictatorship and Default: Urban-Rural Bias and Economic Crises across Regimes*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Bechtel, Michael M., Hainmueller, Jens and Yotam Margalit. 2014. "Preferences for International Redistribution: The Divide over the Eurozone Bailouts." *American Journal of Political Science*, 58(4), 835-856.

Broz, J. Lawrence, Zhiwen Zhang, and Gaoyang Wang. 2020. "Explaining Foreign Support for China's Global Economic Leadership." *International Organization* 74(3): 417–52.

Calomiris, Charles and Stephen Haber. 2014. *Fragile by Design: The Political Origins of Banking Crises and Scarce Credit*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Copelovitch, Mark and David Andrew Singer. 2017. "Tipping the (Im)Balance: Capital Inflows, Financial Market Structure, and Banking Crises." *Economics and Politics* 29(3): 179-208.

Copelovitch, Mark, Jeffrey Frieden, and Stefanie Walter. 2016. "The Political Economy of the Euro Crisis." *Comparative Political Studies* 49 (7): 811-840.

Devlin, Robert. 1989. *Debt and Crisis in Latin America: The Supply Side of the Story*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Farrell, Henry, and John Quiggin. 2017. "Consensus, Dissensus, and Economic Ideas: Economic Crisis and the Rise and Fall of Keynesianism." *International Studies Quarterly* 61(2): 269–83.

Kaplan, Stephen B. 2012. *Globalization and Austerity Politics in Latin America*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Kindleberger, Charles P. 1978. *Manias, Panics, and Crashes: A History of Financial Crises* (Wiley, sixth edition, with Robert Aliber, 2009; first edition, 1978).

Manger, Mark S. and Thomas Sattler. 2020. "The Origins of Persistent Current Account Imbalances." *Comparative Political Studies* 53(3-4): 631-664.

Reinhart, Carmen, and Kenneth Rogoff. 2009. *This Time is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Schneider, Christina J., and Branislav L. Slantchev. 2018. "The Domestic Politics of International Cooperation: Germany and the European Debt Crisis." *International Organization* 72(1): 1–31.

Walter, Stefanie. 2013. *Financial Crises and the Politics of Macroeconomic Adjustments*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

**Week 10: April 5**

**International Financial Institutions**

**Required:**

Caraway, Teri, Stephanie J. Rickard, and Mark S. Anner. 2012. "International Negotiations and Domestic Politics: The Case of IMF Labor Market Conditionality." *International Organization* 66(1): 27-61.

Copelovitch, Mark. 2010. ["Master or Servant? Common Agency and the Political Economy of IMF Lending."](#) *International Studies Quarterly* 54(1): 49-77.

Dolan, Lindsay and Ricky Clark. 2021. ["Pleasing the Principal: U.S. Influence in World Bank Policymaking."](#) *American Journal of Political Science* 65(1): 36-51.

Dreher, Axel, Jan-Egbert Sturm, and James Raymond Vreeland. 2009. "Development Aid and International Politics: Does Membership on the UN Security Council Influence World Bank Decisions?" *Journal of Development Economics* 88(1): 1-18.

Nelson, Stephen C. 2014. "Playing Favorites: How Shared Beliefs Shape the IMF's Lending Decisions." *International Organization* 68(2): 297-328

Schneider, Christina and Jennifer Tobin. 2020. ["The Political Economy of Bilateral Bailouts."](#) *International Organization* 74(1): 1-29.

Stone, Randall. 2008. "The Scope of IMF Conditionality." *International Organization* 62(4): 589-620.

**Further Reading:**

Broz, J. Lawrence, and Michael Brewster Hawes. 2006. "Congressional Politics of Financing the International Monetary Fund." *International Organization* 60(2): 367-399.

Dreher, Axel, Jan-Egbert Sturm, and James Raymond Vreeland. 2009. "Global Horse Trading: IMF Loans for Votes in the United Nations Security Council." *European Economic Review* 53(7): 742-57.

Gould, Erica R. 2003. "Money Talks: Supplementary Financiers and International Monetary Fund Conditionality." *International Organization* 57(3): 551-86.

Lang, Valentin F. and Presbitero, Andrea F. 2018. "Room for Discretion? Biased Decision-Making in International Financial Institutions." *Journal of Development Economics* 130(C): 1-16.

Malik, Rabia and Randall Stone. 2018. "Corporate Influence in World Bank Lending," *The Journal of Politics* 80(1): 103-118.

McDowell, Daniel. 2017. *Brother Can You Spare a Billion? The United States, the IMF, and the International Lender of Last Resort*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Nelson, Stephen C. 2017. *The Currency of Confidence: How Economic Beliefs Shape the IMF's Relationship with Its Borrowers*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Pop-Eleches, Grigore. 2009. "Public Goods or Political Pandering: Evidence from IMF Programs in Latin America and Eastern Europe." *International Studies Quarterly* 53: 787-816.

Pratt, Tyler. 2021. [“Angling for Influence: Institutional Proliferation in Development Banking.”](#) *International Studies Quarterly* 65(1): 95-108.

Sahasrabudde, Aditi. 2019. “Drawing the Line: The Politics of Federal Currency Swaps in the Global Financial Crisis.” *Review of International Political Economy* 461-489.

Stone, Randall C. 2002. *Lending Credibility: The IMF and the Post-Communist Transition*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Stone, Randall W. 2004. “The Political Economy of IMF Lending in Africa.” *American Political Science Review* 98(4): 577–91.

Stone, Randall (2011) *Controlling Institutions: International Organizations and the Global Economy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Vreeland, James R. 2003. *The IMF and Economic Growth*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

James Vreeland. 2007. *The International Monetary Fund: Politics of Conditional Lending*. New York: Routledge.

Weaver, Catherine. 2009. *The Poverty Trap: the World Bank and the Hypocrisy of Reform*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

## **Week 11:        April 12                                Foreign Aid and Development Lending**

### **Required:**

Baker, Andy. 2015. [“Race, Paternalism and Foreign Aid: Evidence from U.S. Public Opinion.”](#) *American Political Science Review* 109(1): 93-109.

Bermeo, Sarah B. 2017. “Aid Allocation and Targeted Development in an Increasingly Connected World.” *International Organization* 71(4): 735–66.

Briggs, Ryan. 2021. [“Why Does Aid Not Target the Poorest?”](#) *International Studies Quarterly* 00: 1-14. (In case you’re interested, there’s also a [VoxDev piece](#) on this research).

Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, and Alastair Smith. 2009. “A Political Economy of Aid.” *International Organization* 63(2): 309–40.

Dreher, Axel, Andreas Fuchs, Brad Parks, Austin M. Strange, and Michael J. Tierney. 2018. “Apples and Dragon Fruits: The Determinants of Aid and Other Forms of State Financing from China to Africa.” *International Studies Quarterly* 62(1): 182–94.

Milner, Helen V., and Dustin Tingley. 2010. “The Political Economy of U.S. Foreign Aid: American Legislators and the Domestic Politics of Aid.” *Economics & Politics* 22(2): 200–232.

Tobin, Jennifer and Desha Girod. 2016. [“Take the Money and Run: The Determinants of Compliance with Aid Agreements.”](#) *International Organization* 70(1): 209-239.

### Further Reading:

Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson, and James A. Robinson. 2002. "Reversal of Fortune: Geography and Institutions in the Making of the Modern World Income Distribution." *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 117(4): 1231–1294.

Acemoglu, Daron, and James A. Robinson. 2006. "Economic Backwardness in Political Perspective." *American Political Science Review* 100(1): 115–31.

Alesina, Alberto, and David Dollar. 2000. "Who Gives Foreign Aid to Whom and Why?" *Journal of Economic Growth* 5(1): 33–63.

Bermeo, Sarah and David Leblang. 2015. "Migration and Foreign Aid." *International Organization* 69(3): 627–657.

Bermeo, Sarah B. 2016. "Aid Is Not Oil: Donor Utility, Heterogeneous Aid, and the Aid-Democratization Relationship." *International Organization* 70(1): 1–32.

Briggs, Ryan C. 2017. "Does Foreign Aid Target the Poorest?" *International Organization* 71(1): 187–206.

Brooks, Sarah M., and Marcus J. Kurtz. 2016. "Oil and Democracy: Endogenous Natural Resources and the Political 'Resource Curse.'" *International Organization* 70(2): 279–311.

Bunte, Jonas. 2019. *Raise the Debt: How Developing Countries Choose Their Creditors*. Oxford University Press.

Burnside, Craig, and David Dollar. 2000. "Aid, Policies, and Growth." *American Economic Review* 90(4): 847–868.

Carnegie, Allison, and Nikolay Marinov. 2017. "Foreign Aid, Human Rights, and Democracy Promotion: Evidence from a Natural Experiment." *American Journal of Political Science* 61(4): 671–683.

Dietrich, Simone. 2016. "Donor Political Economies and the Pursuit of Aid Effectiveness." *International Organization* 70(1): 65–102.

Dunning, Thad. 2004. "Conditioning the Effects of Aid: Cold War Politics, Donor Credibility and Democracy in Africa." *International Organization* 58(2): 409–423.

Easterly, William. 2003. "Can Foreign Aid Buy Growth?" *The Journal of Economic Perspectives* 17(3): 23–48.

Gelpern, Anna, Sebastian Horn, Scott Morris, Brad Parks and Christoph Trebesch. 2021. ["How China Lends: A Rare Look at 100 Debt Contracts with Foreign Governments."](#) Peterson Institute for International Economics Working Paper 21-7.

Morrison, Kevin M. 2009. "Oil, Nontax Revenue, and the Redistributive Foundations of Regime Stability." *International Organization* 63(1): 107–38. (32 pp.)

Pin, Szu-Ning, Yi-Ting Wang and Wen-Yang Chang. 2020. ["The Effects of China's Development Projects on Political Accountability."](#) *British Journal of Political Science* 1–20.

Ross, Michael L. 1999. "The Political Economy of the Resource Curse." *World Politics* 51(2): 297–322.

Sachs, Jeffrey D., and Andrew M. Warner. 2001. "The Curse of Natural Resources." *European Economic Review* 45(4–6): 827–838.

Schneider, Christina J. and Jennifer L. Tobin. 2016. "Portfolio Similarity and the Diversification of Multilateral Aid." *International Studies Quarterly* 60(4): 647–664.

Williams, Martin J. 2017. "[The Political Economy of Unfinished Development Projects: Corruption, Clientelism or Collective Choice?](#)" *American Political Science Review* 111(4): 705–723.

Wright, Joseph, and Matthew Winters. 2010. "The Politics of Effective Foreign Aid." *Annual Review of Political Science* 13(1): 61–80.

**Week 12:        April 19                                Labor, Migration and Remittances**

**Required:**

Goodman, Sara Wallace and Thomas Pepinsky. 2021. "The Exclusionary Foundations of Embedded Liberalism." *International Organization* 75(2): 411–439.

Peters, Margaret E. 2015. "Open Trade, Closed Borders: Immigration Policy in the Era of Globalization." *World Politics* 67(1): 114–54.

Scheve, Kenneth F., and Matthew J. Slaughter. 2001. "Labor Market Competition and Individual Preferences over Immigration Policy." *Review of Economics and Statistics* 83(1): 133–145.

Singer, David Andrew. 2010. "Migrant Remittances and Exchange Rate Regimes in the Developing World." *American Political Science Review* 104(2): 307–23.

Tertytchnaya, Katerina, Catherine de Vries, Hector Solaz, and David Doyle. 2018. "When the Money Stops: Fluctuations in Financial Remittances and Incumbent Approval in Central Eastern Europe, the Caucasus and Central Asia." *American Political Science Review* 112(4): 758– 74.

Zeitz, Alexandra O. and David A. Leblang. 2021. "[Migrants as Engines of Financial Globalization: The Case of Global Banking.](#)" *International Studies Quarterly* 65(2): 360–374.

**Further Reading:**

Bearce, David H., and Andrew F. Hart. 2017. "International Labor Mobility and the Variety of Democratic Political Institutions." *International Organization* 71(1): 65–95.

Dancygier, Rafaela and Michael Donnelly. 2013. "Sectoral Economies, Economic Contexts, and Attitudes towards Immigration." *Journal of Politics* 75(1):17–35.

Greenhill, Brian, Layna Mosley, and Aseem Prakash. 2009. "Trade-Based Diffusion of Labor Rights: A Panel Study, 1986–2002." *American Political Science Review* 103(4): 669–90.

Hainmueller, Jens, and Daniel J. Hopkins. 2015. "The Hidden American Immigration Consensus: A Conjoint Analysis of Attitudes toward Immigrants." *American Journal of Political Science*. 59(3): 529–548.



Leblang, David. 2010. "Familiarity Breeds Investment: Diaspora Networks and International Investment." *American Political Science Review* 104(3): 584-600.

Mosley, Layna and David Singer. 2015. "Migration, Labor, and the International Political Economy." *Annual Review of Political Science* 18: 283-301.

Peters, Margaret E. 2014. "Trade, Foreign Direct Investment and Immigration Policy Making in the US." 2014. *International Organization* 68 (4): 811-844.

Peters, Margaret E. 2017. *Trading Barriers: Immigration and the Remaking of Globalization*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

### **Week 13:      April 26                      The Political Economy of Climate**

#### **Required:**

Bechtel, Michael M., Federica Genovese, and Kenneth F. Scheve. 2019. "Interests, Norms and Support for the Provision of Global Public Goods: The Case of Climate Co-Operation." *British Journal of Political Science* 49(4): 1333–55.

Colgan, Jeff, Jessica Green and Thomas Hale. 2021. "[Asset Revaluation and the Existential Politics of Climate Change.](#)" *International Organization* 75(2): 586-610.

Cory, Jared, Michael Lerner and Iain Osgood. 2021. "[Supply Chain Linkages and the Extended Carbon Coalition.](#)" *American Journal of Political Science* 65: 69-87.

Gaikwad, Nikhar, Federica Genovese, and Dustin Tingley. 2022. "[Creating Climate Coalitions: Mass Preferences for Compensating Vulnerability in the World's Two Largest Democracies.](#)" Working Paper, Harvard University.

Graham, Erin R. and Alexandria Serdaru. 2020. "[Power, Control and the Logic of Substitution in International Design: the Case of International Climate Finance.](#)" *International Organization* 74(4): 671-706.

Kennard, Amanda. 2020. "The Enemy of my Enemy: When Firms Support Climate Change Regulation." *International Organization* 74(2): 187-221.

Lipsky, Philip. 2020. "COVID-19 and the Politics of Crisis." *International Organization* 74(S1): E98-E217.

#### **Further Reading:**

Aklin, Michaël, and Matto Mildemberger. 2020. "Prisoners of the Wrong Dilemma: Why Distributive Conflict, Not Collective Action, Characterizes the Politics of Climate Change." *Global Environmental Politics* 20(4): 4–27.

Andonova, Liliana B, Thomas N Hale, and Charles B Roger. 2017. "National Policy and Transnational Governance of Climate Change: Substitutes or Complements?" *International Studies Quarterly* 61(2): 253–68.

Bechtel, Michael M, and Kenneth F Scheve. 2013. "Mass Support for Global Climate Agreements

Depends on Institutional Design.” *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences* 110(34): 13763–13768.

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Genovese, Federica. 2019. “Sectors, Pollution, and Trade: How Industrial Interests Shape Domestic Positions on Global Climate Agreements.” *International Studies Quarterly* 63(4): 819–36.

Green, Jessica. 2013. *Rethinking Private Authority: Agents and Entrepreneurs in Global Environmental Governance*. Princeton: Princeton University Press

Hale, Thomas. 2020. “Transnational Actors and Transnational Governance in Global Environmental Politics.” *Annual Review of Political Science* 23(1): 203–20.

Kim, Inwook. 2020. “Swinging Shale: Shale Oil, the Global Oil Market, and the Geopolitics of Oil.” *International Studies Quarterly* 64(3): 544–57.

Meckling, Jonas, and Llewelyn Hughes. 2017. "Globalizing Solar: Global Supply chains and trade preferences." *International Studies Quarterly* 61(2): 225-235.

Ostrom, Elinor. 1990. *Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Perlman, Rebecca L. 2019. “For Safety or Profit? How Science Serves the Strategic Interests of Private Actors.” *American Journal of Political Science* 64(2): 290-308.

Tingley, Dustin and Michael Tomz. 2021. “[The Effects of Naming and Shaming on Public Support for Compliance with International Agreements: An Experimental Analysis of the Paris Agreement.](#)” *International Organization* 1-24.