

SPI 571C
Topics in Development: Political Risk Analysis
Spring 2026
Prof. Layna Mosley

Course meetings: Mondays, 1:30-4:30pm
Robertson Hall, Room 029

Contact Information:

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Office Hours: Tuesdays, 8:30am to 11:30am, and by appointment
[Please book office hours appointments in advance.](#)

Course Overview: This course explores the impact of international and national political institutions, as well as political events, on firms' and investors' strategies and decisions. Political institutions, including trade and investment agreements; democratic or non-democratic governance structures; and national labor and environmental regulations affect business strategy decisions. Political events, especially elections as well as mass protest and demonstrations, also can heighten political risk.

In this course, we draw on academic research to consider how national governments interact with economic actors. Firms and governments each attempt to anticipate how the other will act, given the rules of the game as well as the interests at stake. When making decisions, firms and investors assess risk (at the country as well as firm level); governments often seek to ameliorate perceptions of political risk, via domestic or international mechanisms. We approach these issues via the lens of case studies of specific events, firms and countries. These cases allow us to draw out broader lessons, as well as to appreciate how social scientists have evaluated the links between political institutions and economic exchange.

The primary pedagogical approach to this class will be the **case method**, where we will read in detail about specific business experiences with different facets of political risk. Although the case method is used in business and law schools, it is less often used in public policy courses. A case-based approach focuses on key problems and decisions that define a country's or a firm's experience. Additional required readings supplement the cases by offering broader theoretical and empirical context of the different country and issue experiences this course covers. *The first reading of the course describes how students can best take advantage of the case method.*

Each week, we will focus on a specific topic related to the intersection of politics and economics in the global system. The assigned readings will include one or two cases, which serve to illustrate strategic interactions between firms and national governments (as well as international organizations, non-governmental actors and other stakeholders). The assigned readings for each week also include social science articles offering a more theoretically focused and/or broader empirical analysis of the phenomena under discussion. Some weeks' assigned readings also include an article that is more policy-oriented but, again, focused on the broader trends or issues illustrated by that week's case(s).

We will devote some of our class meeting time to the presentation and discussion of broader concepts associated with the assigned cases. In doing so, we will use the assigned social science-oriented readings to place the issues from each case in a broader context, as well as to consider how the dynamics illustrated by a specific case might vary across countries and over time. In reading the non-case articles, you may find it most useful to focus on what the author's main theoretical or causal argument is, as well as on the evidence they use to test that argument.

The remainder of our class meetings will be spent discussing the specific cases. In preparing for class each week, you may find it most useful to begin by reading the cases; whether you write a memo for that week or not, the memo prompt may help you to focus your preparation. After reading and considering the cases, move on to reading the other assigned pieces. These other pieces typically are listed in alphabetical order, by the authors' last name; where the listing departs from alphabetical, the pieces are in the suggested reading order.

Instructor: Layna Mosley is Professor in School of Public and International Affairs, as well as in the Department of Politics. Mosley's research addresses international and comparative political economy. She directs the Princeton Sovereign Finance Lab, part of the Niehaus Center for Globalization and Governance. Mosley's first book, *Global Capital and National Governments* (2003), examines the politics of sovereign debt; her second book, *Labor Rights and Multinational Production* (2011) explores the consequences of economic globalization for workers' rights in developing countries. Mosley's current research concerns the politics of sovereign finance; the effects of multinational production and global supply chains on worker rights; and the governance of international financial markets.

Mosley was a first-generation college student. She earned her Ph.D. from Duke University. Mosley joined the faculty at Princeton University in 2020, after spending sixteen years on the faculty at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill and five years on the faculty at the University of Notre Dame.

Course Requirements, Expectations and Grading: The course is largely oriented around a set of cases, usually two each week, to illustrate broader patterns. The case-based method relies on students' active engagement with the assigned material, in terms of reading all the assigned materials carefully prior to the class meeting and arriving prepared to discuss the material before each meeting. ***I suggest that you complete the readings in the order in which they are listed in the syllabus. For class meetings with two cases, we usually will discuss one case during the first half of class; and the other case in the second half (rather than discussing the cases simultaneously).***

I expect all students to engage in, and remain engaged in throughout the class meeting, our discussions. I will lead our discussion through the cases for each week, and I will expect every student to be ready to provide details of our cases. To reflect the importance of active involvement in our classroom discussions, **participation in class discussion** accounts for 25 percent of the final course grade. As part of this component, each student will be asked to offer brief **discussion opening questions and comments** (5 to 10 minutes in total) related to the assigned non-case readings for one week. I will circulate a sign up for this after our January 26 meeting.

Once we have discussed the cases, we will return our discussion to the broader issues they raise. The non-case readings for each week are intended to address these issues – how, for instance, does the presence of investor-state dispute settlement change the dynamics between firms and host country governments? Or what do we know about the broader patterns in terms of governments' ability to borrow from private investors? Or what current policy challenges exist in the realms of trade,

investment, multinational production and finance? Our conversations will focus more on the theoretical and causal claims than on the empirical results; while you should read the empirical material, we will probably worry less about (for instance) how scholars operationalize each variable is operationalized, or which statistical modeling choices they make.

Some of the assigned materials assume familiarity with concepts related to the global economy, such as trade, exchange rates and capital flows. I am happy to answer questions about these concepts during our course meetings or during office hours. If you would like more background on how various facets – trade, exchange rates, foreign direct investment and the like – of the global economy work, you may find Thomas Oatley’s textbook ([*International Political Economy: Interests and Institutions in the Global Economy*](#)) useful.

Please keep in mind that our classroom meeting environment should be professional and inclusive. While we may disagree on questions of policy or have different interpretations of events and arguments, we treat each other respectfully. To the extent that we take issue with someone’s argument, we focus our criticism on specific claims and logic, rather than on an individual. We also are mindful that good discussion involves both listening and speaking; we are careful not to interrupt or talk over one another, as well as to be sure that all have an opportunity to participate.

Over the course of the semester, you are asked to write a total of **four memos**, each focused on a specific assigned case and addressed to a policymaker/actor relevant to that case. (See “memo assignment” listed for each case on the syllabus, **beginning February 2**).

Each memo should be between 850 and 1000 words in length. Memos are due (via Canvas) by **5pm on the Sunday** immediately prior to the class meeting for which the case is assigned. The first memo counts for 10 percent of the final course grade; remaining memos account for 12.5 percent of the course grade. You may choose for which weeks and cases you would like to write these four memos, with the following parameters:

- You may only write **one memo per class meeting session**, even though many class sessions include two (and occasionally three) cases.
- Late memo submissions are not accepted.
- Your first memo should be written **no later** than for one of the **February 16** cases. (This allows for some feedback relatively early in the semester).
- You do not need to inform me in advance of the weeks or cases for which you plan to write.

I will provide more guidance on the memo assignment in a separate document. Unless noted otherwise in the “memo assignment” for each case, your memo should be based on the facts available **at the time** the case occurs. If, for instance, you’re writing about Vietnam’s development strategy in 2002, you ought not to discuss (or reason based on) the U.S. withdrawal from the Transpacific Trade Partnership in 2017. Or, if you’re deciding whether Malaysia should ratify CP-TPP in 2019, you should not consider what happened to global and Asian trade in 2020. Rather, write as if you are in the moment of the case and decision, using the facts available at that point in time.

You also will **write an Op-Ed**, worth 7.5 percent of the final course grade, focused on political risk and on an ongoing policy debate. This op-ed is between 650-800 words long, and it should be written for an audience that is interested in public policy and attentive to global politics, but without expertise on the specific issue at hand. This assignment is due, again via Canvas, on **March 23** (11:59pm).

The final course assignment is a longer memo (**1500-1800 words**) focusing on the strategic interaction between government(s) and business and identifying the ways in which political institutions and events serve as sources of, or reassurance regarding, political risk. This assignment is due on **May 8**. This memo should focus on a single case, much like many of the cases above. You may address your final memo to an actor or set of actors of your choice (depending on the case, this might be one or more national government officials; staff of an intergovernmental organization; or a firm or industry association).

Professor Mosley will provide a list of possible final cases by **April 13**. You should indicate (via the Canvas assignment) no later than **April 20** which case you'd like to analyze, so that case materials can be provided to you. Alternatively, if you would like to focus your memo on a different case – whether there is a formal “case” write-up in existence or not – you should share details of your chosen case with Professor Mosley by **April 20**.

Summary of course grading components:

Class participation	25%	[all semester, incl. discussion opener]
Case Memo 1	10%	[no later than Feb. 15 for Feb. 16 case]
Case Memo 2	12.5%	[student choice]
Case Memo 3	12.5%	[student choice]
Case Memo 4	12.5%	[student choice]
Op Ed	7.5%	[March 23]
Final Case Analysis	20%	[May 8]

Academic Integrity and Collaboration. Intellectual honesty is the foundation of the academic community, and the submission of original work is the basis for the evaluation of your academic work. For these reasons, all students are expected to abide by the Honor Code and to complete their own work in accordance with the University's academic regulations. I do not permit the use of AI-based tools to compose memos, op-eds or final case assignments. These assignments are intended to reflect your synthesis of the case materials as well as the other assigned readings; they also might reflect your professional experience, or the unique perspective your academic and personal background brings. They are opportunities for analytical creativity and innovation.

You may use AI-based tools to improve grammar or to check spelling. More guidance can be found in [Rights, Rules, and Responsibilities](#) as well as in the handbook [Academic Integrity at Princeton](#). The former contains some specific guidance related to the use of Generative AI:

2.4.6 General Requirements for the Acknowledgment of Sources in Academic Work

Generative Artificial Intelligence: As defined in section **2.4.7**, generative artificial intelligence (AI) is not a source, since its output is not produced by a person. If generative AI is permitted

by the instructor (for brainstorming, outlining, etc.), students must *disclose* its use rather than *cite* or *acknowledge* the use, since it is an algorithm rather than a source. Students are responsible for familiarizing themselves with and adhering to course and departmental policies regarding the use of generative AI. Inappropriate uses of the results of generative AI on any work submitted to fulfill an academic requirement, such as directly copying the output, representing output generated by or derived from generative AI as their own, exceeding the parameters specified by the instructor, or failing to disclose its use, would constitute violations of academic integrity.

Source: <https://rrr.princeton.edu/students-and-university/24-academic-regulations>

2.4.7 Definitions of Academic Violations under the Jurisdiction of the Faculty-Student Committee on Discipline and the Subcommittee on Student Life and Discipline of the Faculty Committee on the Graduate School

Generative AI is not a source as defined in this provision because its output is not created by a person. If generative AI is permitted by the instructor, students must *disclose* its use rather than *cite* or *acknowledge* the use, since it is an algorithm rather than a source. Students are responsible for adhering to course and departmental policies regarding the use of generative AI. Inappropriate uses of generative AI on any work submitted to fulfill an academic requirement, such as directly copying the output, representing output generated by or derived from generative AI as their own (including rewording or paraphrasing output from generative AI and representing it as their own), exceeding the parameters of use specified by the instructor, or failing to disclose its use (including the use of generative AI for rewording, paraphrasing or editing) constitute violations of academic integrity.

Source: <https://rrr.princeton.edu/students-and-university/24-academic-regulations#comp247>

Please be aware that I will refer any suspected infractions of the honor code to the Faculty-Student Committee on Discipline or the Honor Committee, in accordance with University policy. Of course, much of the learning that happens in our course is based on conversations about class material, and those conversations occur not only during, but also before and after our scheduled course meetings. I encourage you to talk with your classmates about the concepts and ideas we discuss, as well as the broader issues we raise.

That said, the material contained in your policy memos, op-ed and final case analysis should reflect your, and only your, summary and analysis. In other words, you are responsible for generating both the content of the paper and its style or presentation, and you cannot allow anyone else to take these responsibilities from you. Once you have submitted the assignments, feel free to discuss them with your peers, and/or to share versions of them with one another.

Schedule of Topics and Reading Assignments

You are expected to read the assigned materials prior to that day's meeting. Please note that our January 26 meeting will be a full class meeting, with an overview of the class and a substantive discussion of the case as well as other assigned articles.

January 26 Introduction to the Course and the Case Method; Contemporary Challenges in the Global Economy

- Laurie George Busuttill and Susan J. Van Weelden. 2018. “Student Guide to the Case Method.” Harvard Business School Publishing. Notes 1 and 3 (8 pages).
- **Case:** (not eligible for a memo): Jeremy Friedman, Brian Kong, Shreya Shankar and Martin Vasev. 2024. “Apple’s Supply Chains: De-Risk or Double-Down on China?” HBS Case 724043-PDF-ENG (35 pp).
- Brett Ashley Leeds, Layna Mosley, B. Peter Rosendorff and [Ayşe Zarakol](#). 2025. [“The Future of Global Governance and World Order.”](#) *International Organization* 79(S1): S1-S11. *This is the introduction to a [special issue](#) of the journal. A couple of the articles also are also later in this syllabus.*
- Heidi E. Crebo-Rediker, Benn Steil, Erin D. Dumbacher, David M. Hart, and Linda Robinson. December 2025. [“Visualizing 2026: Five Foreign Policy Trends to Watch.”](#) Council on Foreign Relations (12 pages).
- International Monetary Fund. 2025. [World Economic Outlook](#) (October), Executive Summary and Chapter 1 (48 pages)
- UN Conference on Trade and Development. 2025. [“A World of Debt: It is Time for Reform.”](#) (25 pages).
- Dev Patel, Justin Sandefur and Arvind Subramanian. 2024. [“A Requiem for Hyperglobalization: Why the World Will Miss History’s Greatest Economic Miracle.”](#) *Foreign Affairs* (11 pages).
- **Optional:** Henry Farrell and Abraham L. Newman. 2019. [“Weaponized Interdependence: How Global Economic Networks Shape State Coercion.”](#) *International Security* 44(1): 42-79.
- **Optional:** For descriptive data on “geoeconomic pressure,” review Christopher Clayton, Antonio Coppola, Matteo Maggiori, Jesse Schreger’s [measure](#).

February 2 Trade, Industrial Policy and Geopolitics

- **Case:** Jeremy Friedman, Madison Whitt, Charlie Li. “Balancing Act: Nvidia's Strategy in the US-China Semiconductor Standoff.” August 2024. Harvard Business School Case 725009-PDF-ENG (35 pages).
 - **Memo assignment: to Jensen Huang (CEO, Nvidia), February 2024:** How should Nvidia respond to the U.S. government’s attempt to restrict the export of advanced semiconductors? In considering potential responses, it is important to account for how Nvidia might expect US-China relations to evolve. One also might consider U.S. domestic politics. For instance, should Nvidia expect other U.S.-based firms to pressure the U.S. government for policy changes?

- Réka Juhász and Nathan Lane. 2024. "[The Political Economy of Industrial Policy.](#)" *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 38 (4): 27–54.
- Sarah Bauerle Danzman. 2026. "[Securitized political economy, investment regulation and business influence in a geoeconomic era.](#)" *European Journal of International Relations*, forthcoming.
- Christopher Clayton, Matteo Maggiori and Jesse Schreger. 2025. "[The Political Economy of Geoeconomic Power.](#)" *AEA Papers and Proceedings* 115: 588-592.
- Andreas Dür and Alessia Invernizzi. 2025. "[Weathering the Storm: US Trade Policy Beyond Trump.](#)" *International Organization* 79(S1): S194-S208.
- Ryan Brutger. 2024. "[Litigation for Sale: Private Firms and WTO Dispute Escalation.](#)" *American Political Science Review* 118(3): 1204-1221.
- **Case:** Regina Abrami. 2005. "Delta Blues: U.S.-Vietnam Catfish Trade Dispute." Harvard Business School Cases 706003-PDF-ENG (A case, 26 pp.) and 706006-PDF-ENG (B case, 11 pp.)
 - **Memo assignment: to the Minister for Planning and Investment, Government of Vietnam.** Given how the U.S. government evaluated the catfish dumping petition in 2002, how ought Vietnam to structure its economic interactions with the United States from that point? Ought Vietnam to change its development priorities and policies? Should Vietnam seek further economic integration, including WTO membership? Should it diversify the set of countries to which it exports, or the set of industries supported by the Ministry?
- **Optional:** A brief (2 pp.) background on [US anti-dumping and countervailing duties](#), from Congressional Research Service (October 2024). This [2021 piece](#) offers more in-depth detail. On the World Trade Organization's operations, see "[The WTO in Brief.](#)" as well as [more detailed information](#) from the WTO. (12 pp.). Episode 9 of the [Trade Talks podcast](#) gives a history of GATT. (Link to [entire series](#), of 200+ episodes, on trade, development, industrial policy and all sorts of other topics). This Petersen Institute policy brief (2023) asks "[Can the World Trade Organization Be Saved? Should It?](#)" (19 pages).

February 9 Preferential Trade Agreements and Unilateral Trade Preference Programs

- **Case:** Nikhar Gaikwad, Kenneth Scheve and Elizabeth van Lieshout. 2019. "Ratification Politics and Preferential Trade Agreements: Malaysia and the CPTPP." Stanford Graduate School of Business Case P99-PDF-ENG. (36 pp.)
 - **Memo assignment: to Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir.** What position should his administration take – domestically as well as internationally – on the CPTPP agreement? Ought the government to ratify it in its current form, advocate for modifications/renegotiation, or abandon participation in the agreement entirely?

- Leonardo Baccini. 2019. [“The Economics and Politics of Preferential Trade Agreements.”](#) *Annual Review of Political Science* 2019 22(1): 75-92.
- C. Carrère, M. Olarreaga, M. and D. Raess. 2022. [“Labor clauses in trade agreements: Hidden protectionism?”](#) *The Review of International Organizations* 17: 453-483.
- Gregory Shaffer. 2024. [“Addressing the Negative Externalities of Trade: Flanking Policies and the Role of Package Treaties.”](#) *World Trade Review* 23(5): 621-644.
- Layna Mosley and B. Peter Rosendorff. 2024. [“A Domestic Political Economy of Package Treaties.”](#) *World Trade Review* 23(5): 645-657.
- **Case:** Rawi Abdelal, Regina Abrami, Noel Maurer and Aldo Musacchio. 2006. “Market and the Mountain Kingdom: Change in Lesotho’s Textile Industry.” Harvard Business School Case 706043-PDF-ENG. (26 pp).
 - **Memo Assignment: to Bethuel Pakalitha Mosisili, Prime Minister of Lesotho.** In 2005, what is Lesotho’s best strategy for economic development? What opportunities for diversification should the government pursue? What is the best way to address the expiration of trade preferences (ATC as well as AGOA), as well as the need for domestic sourcing to ensure duty-free access to key export markets? How might the government use its relatively “labor friendly” environment to gain export advantages?
- Michael H. Gary and Hugh-Grant Chapman. 2025. [“What’s Next for AGOA?”](#) Center for Strategic and International Studies brief, November. (18 pp).
- Mark S. Manger and Kenneth C. Shadlen. 2014. [“Political Trade Dependence and North–South Trade Agreements.”](#) *International Studies Quarterly* 58(1): 79-91.

February 16 Development Strategies and the Global Economy

Note that your first memo should be written no later than for this class session. There are three rather than two memo options available this week. Again, please write no more than one memo per week.

- **Case:** Meg Rithmire and Deborah L. Spar. 2021. “ALDDN: Advancing Local Dairy Development in Nigeria.” Harvard Business School Case 721026-PDF-ENG (27 pp).
 - **Memo Assignment: to Ndidi Nwuneli, co-founder of Sahel Consulting and AACE Foods.** In early 2021, what should Nwuneli advocate for with respect to Nigeria’s trade policies? Specifically, to what extent is it desirable and/or politically feasible to press the government to increase tariffs on imported milk products? How does this relate to the interests of various groups in Nigeria, as well as to the policies set by ECOWAS and the WTO?
- G-20. South Africa Expert Panel Report. 2025. [“Growth, Debt and Development: Opportunities for a New African Partnership.”](#) (36 pp).

- Lindsay Dolan and Helen Milner. 2023. “Low-Skilled Liberalizers: Support for Free Trade in Africa.” *International Organization* 77(4): 848-870.
- **Case:** Mikael Samuelsson, Sarah Boyd and Luvuyo Mncanca. 2025. “Djamo: Leveraging Fintech to Unlock Cross-Border Financial Services in West Africa.” HBS Case UCT025-PDF-ENG (21 pages).
 - **Memo Assignment: to Hassan Bourgi and Régis Bamba, co-CEOs of Djamo, April 2024:** What should Djamo’s strategy be over the next year: should it deepen operations in Cote d’Ivoire and Senegal, or should it expand to additional countries in West Africa? How should its experiences in these two countries – especially in terms of interacting with banking and financial regulatory authorities – inform these choices?
- **Case:** Laura Alfaro, Carla Larangeira and Ruth Costas. 2022. “El Salvador: Launching Bitcoin as Legal Tender.” Harvard Business School Case 322055-PDF-ENG (35 pages).
 - **Memo Assignment: to the leaders of El Salvador’s political opposition (FMLN, ARENA, VAMOS), in February 2022:** Provide an assessment of whether El Salvador should continue its policy of allowing Bitcoin as legal tender, alongside the US dollar. To what extent have the benefits – domestic as well as international -- suggested by President Bukele materialized? What are the risks that have emerged since Bitcoin’s adoption in 2021? As they look to the February 2024 elections, what should the political opposition’s stance on currency policy be, and why?
- Tobias Pferr, Fabian Pape and Johannes Petry. 2025. [“Dollar Diminished: The Unmaking of US Financial Hegemony Under Trump.”](#) *International Organization*. 2025;79(S1): S117-S133.
- B. R. Bessen and Brendan Connell. 2024. [“Another Day, Another Currency: Self-interest, Experience, and Attitudes Toward Dollarization in Ecuador.”](#) *Political Behavior* 46: 587–608.

February 23 **Multinational Corporations, Political Regimes and Property Rights**

- **Case:** Dante Roscini, Michael Shih-ta Chen and Keith Chi-ho Wong. 2013. “Asia Optical: The Myanmar Decision.” Harvard Business School Case 714026-PDF-ENG (34 pp).
 - **Memo Assignment to Robert Lai, Chairman of Asia Optical,** on your assessment of the political and/or economic risks associated with expanding production (via a second factory) in Myanmar (Burma) in 2012. You might discuss, among other things, domestic laws related to foreign investment; labor costs and worker rights; and changes that could be expected to result from the 2015 election.
- Carolina Moehlecke and Rachel L. Wellhausen. 2022. [“Political Risk and International Investment Law.”](#) *Annual Review of Political Science* 25(1): 485-507.
- Geoffrey Gertz. 2018. [“Commercial Diplomacy and Political Risk.”](#) *International Studies Quarterly* 62(1): 94–107.

- Glen Biglaiser, David Lektzian, and Kelan (Lilly) Lu. 2024. [“The Effects of US Sanctions on Chinese Public and Private Overseas Foreign Direct Investment.”](#) *The Journal of Politics* 86(3): 1060-1074.
- **Case:** George Allayannis and Aldo Sesia. 2025. “Investment Decisions: Geopolitical Risks Face Off.” HBS Case UV9263-PDF-ENG. (27 pp).
 - **Memo assignment: to the CEO of Doberman Asset Management (DAM), March 2025:** Given current and anticipated political risks and opportunities – geopolitical as well as domestic – should DAM invest in Intel or TSMC? While the case is set up as offering a choice between these two investments, your memo also could suggest that DAM avoid the semiconductor industry altogether and invest in other sectors or assets. You may justify your recommendation using ideas from the PESTLES framework, or you could point out how this framework falls short.
- Aycan Katitas. 2026. [“China’s Rise—Threat or Opportunity? The Pacifying Effect of Chinese Foreign Direct Investment on American Threat Perceptions.”](#) *The Journal of Politics* 88(1): 444-448.
- F. Chen and J. Xu. 2023. [“Partners with Benefits: When Multinationals Succeed in Authoritarian Courts.”](#) *International Organization* 77(1): 144-178.

March 2 Evaluating the Effects of MNCs and Foreign Direct Investment

There are **three** rather than two memo options available this week. Again, please write no more than one memo per week.

- Alessandro Guasti and Mathias Koenig-Archibugi. 2022. [“Has Global Trade Competition Really Led to a Race to the Bottom in Labor Standards?”](#) *International Studies Quarterly* 66(4).
- **Case:** Andrew Hoffman. 2023. “H&M, Rana Plaza, and Beyond: Fast Fashion Under the Microscope.” HBS Case Study W35C70-PDF-ENG (30 pp).
 - **Memo Assignment: to Kristina Nilsson, Head of Sustainability at H&M, August 2021.** Should H&M re-sign the International Accord? Your recommendations could consider the effectiveness of the Accord in addressing conditions in the garment sector in Bangladesh, as well as in protecting firms from reputational risk. You also could consider how the Accord compares to other initiatives – firm-based or government based – that seek to regulate conditions in the garment industry.
- **Case:** Manolito Hibanada, Ari Van Assche and Hinrick. 2022. “Transparency, Traceability, and Compliance in Uniqlo's Global Value Chain.” HBS Case W27299-PDF-ENG (14 pp).
 - **Memo Assignment: to the CEO of Uniqlo/Fast Retailing, in May 2021:** What does the January 2021 detention of a shipment by the US Customs and Border Patrol indicate about the effectiveness of Uniqlo’s current sustainability and supply chain monitoring policies, especially as they relate to the use of forced labor? How, if at all, should the firm modify these policies and practices? Your memo could consider

regulatory changes not only in the US market, but also in other locations where Uniqlo is active.

- Benjamin Cashore, Jette Steen Knudsen, Jeremy Moon, and Hamish van der Ven. 2021. [“Private authority and public policy interactions in global context: Governance spheres for problem solving.”](#) *Regulation & Governance* 15: 1166-1182.
- Edmund Malesky and Layna Mosley. 2018. [“Chains of Love? Global Production and the Firm-Level Diffusion of Labor Standards.”](#) *American Journal of Political Science* 62: 712-728.
- **Case:** David Bishop and Jamie Chan. 2021. “Big Chocolate: Child Slavery in the Cocoa Industry.” HBS Case HK1370-PDF-ENG (24 pp).
 - **Memo assignment: to the CEO of Nestlé:** given the failure of the Responsible Business Initiative proposal to garner sufficient support for passage in Switzerland, what should your firm do with respect to due diligence in its cocoa supply chain? You might consider the extent of obligations under Swiss law; reputation-based risks to the firm; governance via Nestlé’s Cocoa Plan; and the practical challenges associated with supply chain monitoring in Ghana and Côte d'Ivoire.

March 9 Spring Break, no class meeting

March 16 Regulating Multinational Production and Global Supply Chains

- **Case:** Morris Mthombeni, Albert Wocke, Alvaro Cuervo-Cazurra. 2020. “McKinsey & Company: Facilitating Bribery in South Africa.” Harvard Business School Case W20689-PDF-ENG (18 pp).
 - **Memo Assignment: to Cyril Ramaphosa, President of South Africa,** on how to encourage the development and growth of Black-owned businesses, while also limiting corruption in South Africa. What lessons does the McKinsey & Company episode hold for supplier development requirements (including a law requiring those contracting with state owned enterprises to partner with a local Black-owned firm)? Under what circumstances do these requirements have unintended consequences? Are there ways in which they can be better designed or implemented in South Africa?
- Terrence L. Chapman, Nathan M. Jensen, Edmund J. Malesky and Scott Wolford. 2021. [““Leakage” in International Regulatory Regimes: Did the OECD Anti-bribery Convention Increase Bribery?”](#) *Quarterly Journal of Political Science* 16(4): 387-427.
- Lorenzo Crippa, Edmund J. Malesky and Lucio Picci. 2025. [“Making Bribery Profitable Again? The Market Effects of Suspending Accountability for Overseas Bribery.”](#) *International Organization* 79(4): 739-758.
- **Case:** Vanina Farber and Shih-Han Huang. 2025. “Green or Greenwashing? A 95 Million Dollar Sustainability Paradox for Michelin and BNP Paribas.” HBS Case IM550-PDF-ENG (24pp.)

Memo assignment: to Mr. Florent Menegaux, CEO of the Michelin Group, April 2021: What are the lessons of the TLFF I project for Michelin’s corporate strategy, especially as it concerns ESG-related projects? Do you recommend that Michelin use multi-stakeholder vehicles/initiatives to finance projects in the rubber sector? If not, why? If so, how should future projects be modified, as a means of addressing the problems that emerged in Indonesia? How practical are these modifications?

- Darin Christensen. 2019. “[Concession Stands: How Mining Investments Incite Protest in Africa.](#)” *International Organization* 73(1): 65-101.
- Michael G. Findley, Daniel L. Nielson, and J. C. Sharman. 2025. “[Banking bad? A global field experiment on risk, reward, and regulation.](#)” *American Journal of Political Science* 69: 545–559.

March 23 [Class rescheduled because of International Studies Association annual meeting]

The Op-Ed assignment is due today (post to Canvas by 11:59pm).

March 30 Development Financing and Official Sector Creditors

- Blair, Robert A., Samantha Custer, and Philip Roessler. 2025. “[Elites, the aid curse, and Chinese development finance: A conjoint survey experiment on elites’ aid preferences in 141 low- and middle-income countries.](#)” *American Journal of Political Science* 69: 1519–1540.
- **Case:** Rafael Di Tella, Vincent Pons, Sarah Mehta and David Lane. 2018. “Goodbye IMF Conditions, Hello Chinese Capital: Zambia’s Copper Industry and Africa’s Break with Its Colonial Past.” Harvard Business School Case 717034-PDF-ENG. (37 pp).
 - **Memo assignment: to Zambian President Edgar Lungu, in 2016,** regarding a strategy for accessing foreign financing, considering Zambia’s economic state as well as its credit ratings downgrade. Should Zambia orient its trade, aid and investment efforts toward China? Should it instead seek financing from the International Monetary Fund and/or World Bank? Should Zambia appear to traditional western donor countries (collectively represented by the OECD DAC)? Or would private market financing be a better choice? Your memo also should consider the potential domestic political consequences of these various forms of investment and borrowing.
- Deborah Brautigam. 2022. “[China and Zambia: creating a sovereign debt crisis.](#)” *International Affairs* 98(4): 1347-1365.
- Ben Cormier. 2023. “[Chinese or Western Finance? Transparency, Official Credit Flows and the International Political Economy of Development.](#)” *Review of International Organization* 18: 297-328.

- **Case:** Meg Rithmire and Yihao Li. 2019. “Chinese Infrastructure Investments in Sri Lanka: A Pearl or a Teardrop on the Belt and Road?” Harvard Business School Case 719046-PDF-ENG (34 pp).

- **Memo assignment: to Scott Nathan, CEO of the US Development Finance Corporation, February 2022** (when he takes office). What principles should guide the US participation in bilateral official lending? How should the behavior and motives of China, especially in the context of its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) influence US choices and priorities related to official financing for low- and middle-income country governments?

- Sebastian Horn, Carmen M. Reinhart and Christoph Trebesch. 2025. [“China’s Lending to Developing Countries: from Boom to Bust.”](#) *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 39(4): 75-100.
- Umesh Moramudali and Thilina Panduwawala. 2024. [“The Political Economy of the Hambantota Port: Unveiling the Realities of Debt Trap Diplomacy and BRI Vision.”](#) *Asian Journal of Political Science* 32(3): 380-399.

April 6 Private Creditors, Sovereign Lending and the Bretton Woods Institutions

Note that there is only one case/memo option for this week.

- **Case:** Sophus A. Reinert, Katharine Bodnar and Leah Kaplow. 2020. “Kenya and the Silicon Savannah.” Harvard Business School Case 720032-PDF-ENG (39 pp).
 - **Memo assignment: to Raila Odinga, leader of the opposition in Kenya (and many-time presidential candidate), January 2020:** How, and to what extent, should Kenya’s government engage with foreign firms and foreign lenders as part of Kenya’s development strategy? This might include encouraging foreign direct investment and foreign provision of services (such as mobile banking); the creation of special economic zones; and/or infrastructure financing from foreign creditors (China, the US, or private sector lenders, among others).
- Cameron Ballard-Rosa, Layna Mosley and Rachel Wellhausen. 2021. [“Contingent Advantage? Sovereign Borrowing, Democratic Institutions and Global Capital Cycles.”](#) *British Journal of Political Science* (21 pp).
- Valentin Lang, Lukas Wellner and Alexandros Kentikelenis. 2025. [“Biased Bureaucrats and the Policies of International Organizations.”](#) *American Journal of Political Science* 69: 1486-1504.
- Alexandra Zeitz. 2022. [“Global Capital Cycles and Market Discipline: Perceptions of Developing-Country Borrowers.”](#) *British Journal of Political Science* 52(4): 1944-1953.
- Valentine Lang, David Mihalyi, and Andrea F. Presbitero. 2023. "Borrowing Costs after Sovereign Debt Relief." *American Economic Journal: Economic Policy* 15 (2): 331–58.

- Lindsay Dolan and Ricky Clark. 2021. [“Pleasing the Principal: U.S. Influence in World Bank Policymaking.”](#) *American Journal of Political Science* 65: 36-51.
- Benjamin DaBler, Angelo Gerber-Helm and Mirko Heinzl. 2025. [“Partners and rivals? The AIIB’s cooperation with preexisting multilateral development banks.”](#) *Review of International Political Economy*, 1–29.

April 13 Debt Crises, Defaults and Sovereign Restructurings

- **Case:** Michael Moffett, 2015. “Argentina and the Vulture Funds.” HBS Case TB0395-PDF-ENG (12 pp).
 - **Memo assignment: to [the Group of 20 Finance Ministers, January 2026:](#)** What is the best way address sovereign debt restructurings and defaults. Given the practices of holdout creditors (such as Elliott Associates, sometimes referred to as “vulture funds”) and courts’ rulings related to their claims, is there a more orderly or fair way to address situations in which a government defaults on (or wants to restructure, to avoid default) its debt?
- Sean Hagan and Brad Setser. 2024. [“Restructuring sovereign debt: The need for a coordinated framework”](#). PIIE Policy Brief 24-4 (14 pp).
- Muyang Chen, 2023. [“China’s rise and the reshaping of sovereign debt relief.”](#) *International Affairs* 99(4): 1755–1775.
- Yufan Huang and Deborah Brautigam. 2025. [“Socialization, Policy Opportunity and Bureaucratic Bargaining: Explaining China’s Zig-Zag Engagement with Multilateral Debt Restructuring.”](#) *Review of International Political Economy* 32(4): 1027-1050.
- **Case:** Preeta George and Monika Gupta. 2023. “Sri Lanka’s Macroeconomic Crises: the Tale of Twin Deficits.” HBS Case W31827-PDF-ENG (19 pp).
 - **Memo assignment: to Sri Lanka’s Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe, July 2022.** How should the government of Sri Lanka approach its sovereign creditors, keeping in mind that the country is not covered by the G-20’s Common Framework? What sorts of economic reforms will succeed in helping the country to secure an IMF program and financing assurances from its creditors? What are the domestic political considerations associated with these proposed reforms?
- SAIS Review. 2026. [“How Sovereign Debt Crises are Becoming Geopolitical: Lessons from Sri Lanka.”](#)
- Lauren L. Ferry and Alexandra O. Zeitz. 2024. [“The power of having powerful friends: Evidence from a new dataset of IMF negotiating missions, 1985-2020.”](#) *Review of International Organization* 19: 411-442.

April 20 Trade, Finance and Climate

Guest (tentative): Roberto Sifon-Arevalo, Head of Global Ratings, Standard and Poor's.

- **Case:** Richard H. K. Vietor. 2022. “South Africa: A ‘Just Energy Transition.’” Harvard Business School Case #722069-PDF-ENG (33pp).
 - **Memo Assignment: to Cyril Ramaphosa, President of South Africa, January 2024:** how should the government of South Africa approach its commitments to shift toward renewable energy? In addition to the \$8.5 billion in financing promised by the U.S. and European governments, how else might the transition be financed? And, especially given the general election in March 2024, how should the government address the dislocations for those working and living in coal-producing regions, as well as the long-running failures of EKSOM to provide reliable energy supplies?
- Annika Seiler, Hannah Brown and Samuel Matthews. 2023. “Just Energy Transition Partnerships: Early Successes and Challenges in Indonesia and South Africa.” Center for Global Development blog (11 pp). **Optional:** the full report is [here](#); a more critical analysis, from Farwa Sial at Eurodad in 2024, [is here](#).
- **Case:** George Serafeim and Benjamin Maletta. 2022. “Business Implications from Regulating Carbon Emissions in the EU.” HBS Case 122106-PDF-ENG (49 pp).
 - **Memo assignment: to the European Commission, in January 2023** (as the EU prepares to implement the Transitional Phase of CBAM): How effective should the EU expect CBAM to be at reducing emissions and addressing emissions leakage? How might firms in the concrete and steel industries shift their strategies, and how will other governments respond to CBAM?
- Anatole Boute. 2024. “Accounting for Carbon Pricing in Third Countries Under the EU Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism.” *World Trade Review* 23(2): 169–89.
- G. Magacho, E. Espagne and A. Godin. 2023. “Impacts of the CBAM on EU trade partners: consequences for developing countries.” *Climate Policy*, 24(2): 243–259.
- Erik Voeten. 2025. “Do Domestic Climate Rulings Make Climate Commitments More Credible? Evidence from Stock Market Returns.” *The Journal of Politics* 87(4): 1400-1413.
- Paasha Mahdavi, Jessica Green, Jennifer Hadden, Thomas Hale. 2022. Using Earnings Calls to Understand the Political Behavior of Major Polluters. *Global Environmental Politics* 2022; 22 (1): 159–174.

April 27 Course Wrap-Up: Lessons Learned, Discussion of Final Case Assignment
[scheduled make up class]

Guest (confirmed): Linda Goldberg, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.

- **Case:** Iris Saittakari, Alexei Koveshnikov, Marleen Wierenga. 2025. “Nokian Tyres: Getting a ‘Flat Tire’ from Geopolitics.” HBS Case #W44597-PDF-ENG (21 pages).
 - **Memo assignment: to Jukka Moisio, CEO of Nokian Tyres plc, June 2022:**
Should Nokian remain in Russia, where it manufactures approximately 80 percent of its tires, or should it exit? If Nokian exits, where should it seek to relocate its production? Your memo should consider the range of considerations – ethical, strategic, financial, political – that might inform this decision.
- Linda Goldberg, paper TBA.
- Dongan Tan. 2025. [“The Decoupling Dilemma: How U.S. Sanctions Erode Global Economic Governance.”](#) *International Organization* 79(S1): S134-147.
- World Trade Organization. 2025. [World Trade Report: Making Trade and AI Work Together to the Benefit of All.](#) Read the Executive Summary and Introduction (18 pp.) and at least skim the remaining sections (84 pp). Note there are [slides and video](#) on the report website.
- Alexandra O. Zeitz 2025. [“China, International Finance, and the Global Economic Order.”](#) *Annual Review Political Science*. 28:309-328.